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A First Amendment Deference Approach to
Reforming Anti-Bullying Laws
Emily Suski*
INTRODUCTION
At the risk of making a large understatement, bullying among students is
a complicated problem. It can take multiple forms: physical, verbal, relational,
which includes imposing social isolation on another, and cyberbullying.1
Bullying also occurs on a large scale. According to at least one study,
approximately one-third of students in middle school grades have reported
experiencing bullying.2 In addition, the effects of bullying are varied and
Copyright 2017, by EMILY SUSKI.
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., University of North Carolina. The author
is grateful to the following individuals for the invaluable feedback they provided on
this Article: Scott Bauries, Derek Black, Clark Cunningham, Jim Knoepp, Lauren
Sudeall Lucas, Barry McDonald, Mae Quinn, Eric Segall, and Jonathan Todres. The
author is also grateful to the participants of the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools New Scholars Colloquium, the University of Kentucky College of Law
Developing Ideas Conference, and the Association of American Law Schools
Conference on Clinical Legal Education Works in Progress for feedback on earlier
versions of this Article. Finally, the author owes thanks to Connor Bateman for
excellent research assistance.
1. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has developed
a uniform definition of bullying. That definition is as follows:
[A]ny unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another youth or group of
youths who are not siblings or current dating partners that involves an
observed or perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times
or is highly likely to be repeated. Bullying may inflict harm or distress
on the targeted youth including physical, psychological, social, or
educational harm.
R.M. GLADDEN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CTRL. & PREVENTION, BULLYING
SURVEILLANCE AMONG YOUTHS 7 (2014). The CDC also notes the multiple forms
of bullying, including physical, verbal, and relational, as well as damage to
property. Id. at 7–8.
2. Simone Robers et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2012, 2012
DOJ BUREAU JUST. STAT. ANN. REP. 46 (2013), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/201
3036.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8QH-L54V]. In some studies these numbers are even
higher. One study found that 39% of sixth grade students reported bullying. VICTORIA
STUART-CASSEL ET AL., SOCIAL BULLYING: CORRELATES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
PREVENTION 3 (2013), http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/sites/default/files/1315%2
0NCSSLE%20Social%20Bullying%20d7_lvr_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYC6-GW85].
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significant, ranging from negative academic outcomes to suicide.3 Despite the
complicated and widespread nature of the problem, most states’ anti-bullying
laws call for a school-level response to bullying that lacks a level of nuance to
match the problem.4 Most laws call for, and sometimes require, schools to
respond to bullying no differently than any other serious student disciplinary
problem, which usually means suspending, expelling, or otherwise excluding
students who bully from school.5 This is so despite the fact that social science
research indicates that school exclusion rarely works in response to bullying
and can actually exacerbate it. 6
In addition, when bullying takes the form of speech—as much of it
does—school interventions also implicate the First Amendment. Public
schools are arms of the state.7 Thus, any intervention in response to

3. Infra Part I.A.
4. All of the states now have anti-bullying laws, and almost without
exception, these laws place the responsibility on the schools for addressing the
problem. The vast majority focus schools’ responses implicitly or explicitly on
school exclusion. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Kentucky, Idaho, and
arguably Montana are the three states that do not call for schools to intervene
when bullying happens. Kentucky and Idaho’s laws are in the states’ criminal
codes, so the criminal justice system, not the public schools, has responsibility for
combatting bullying in those states. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150 (West 2016). In Montana, which had no antibullying law until 2015, the law prohibits bullying in schools, but does not
specifically require schools to take actions to address it. Bully-Free Montana Act,
2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through § 20-5210 (West 2016)). Instead, it states that victims can take any recourse available to
them under state or federal law. Id. That said, the law also does not preclude
schools from punishing bullies–it just does not require it.
5. Infra note 57; see also Brea L. Perry & Edward W. Morris, Suspending
Progress: Collateral Consequences of Exclusionary Punishment in Public
Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1067, 1069–70 (2014) (defining and discussing school
exclusion).
6. Infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text. That is not to say that the
bullying laws even with their focus on school exclusion have had no effect. New
research does suggest that the laws have done something to stem the tide of
bullying. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., Associations Between Antibullying
Policies and Bullying in 25 States, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS ONLINE 10 (2015). The
study did not identify the reason bullying laws have had some effect—whether
from raising awareness and therefore increased reporting of bullying or for some
other reason.
7. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(noting “the State in the person of school officials” can impinge on students’ First
Amendment rights in school under some circumstances).
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bullying that also constitutes speech raises First Amendment questions.8
This Article explores the problems associated with school exclusion as a
response to bullying in light of the complicated nature of the problem and
the attendant First Amendment concerns. It argues in favor of drawing on
First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly by deconstructing rationales
for the deference afforded schools to suppress student speech, to develop
better, more comprehensive legal approaches to combatting bullying that
also address those First Amendment concerns. In doing so, it also seeks to
fill a gap in the literature on bullying. Although scholars have explored the
limits that the Constitution, including the First Amendment, places on antibullying laws, they have not done so in light of the complicated nature of
the problem, the interventions called for in response, or by examining the
rationales for public school deference to suppress student speech.9
First, to illustrate the difficulties with crafting responses to bullying,
take the example of Hailee Lamberth. Hailee was a 13-year-old Nevada
public school student who tragically committed suicide on December 12,
2013.10 In her suicide note, Hailee said that she committed suicide because
other students at school had been bullying her.11 According to Hailee’s
father, the students had been calling Hailee names like “fat” and “ugly”
repeatedly over a period of time.12 Hailee’s suicide note asked that her
school be informed of the reasons she committed suicide so that “next
8. Infra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
9. These scholars have assessed how the anti-bullying laws can comply with
First Amendment and Fourth Amendment limits. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman,
Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705 (2012) (arguing that a
particular type of bullying laws, cyberbullying laws, can survive First
Amendment challenges); Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can
Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That
Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment Challenges,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011) (focusing on cyberbullying and proposing
that cyberbullying laws comply with the standards set forth in relevant Supreme
Court cases, including Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District); Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public Schools’ Authority to
Discipline Students’ Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW
ENGLAND J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181 (2011) (arguing that public schools
should be responsible for addressing students’ off-campus cyberbullying and can
under the First and Fourth Amendments).
10. Trevon Milliard, Father: White Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to
Bullying, L.V. REV. J. (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news
/father-white-middle-school-student-s-suicide-related-bullying [https://perma.cc/5W
AT-F8K4].
11. Id.
12. Id.
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time” the school would prevent what happened to her from happening to
another student.13 Notably, at the time Hailee committed suicide, Nevada
had an anti-bullying law in place, one that called for discipline, which
could include school exclusion as a means to address the problem.14
Whether implemented or not, the law did not help Hailee. Indeed, even if
school exclusion could have helped Hailee, though social science literature
suggests it could not, such an intervention may not have been available to
the school because any one-time instance of bullying that Hailee
experienced may have been protected by the First Amendment.15
Although schools do have more latitude to suppress student speech,
including student-bullying speech, than other state actors, that deference is
limited. First, any anti-bullying law has to comply with First Amendment
overbreadth constraints.16 In addition, and as a general matter, schools can
only suppress student speech that would otherwise be protected by the First
Amendment if the schools can reasonably anticipate the speech will cause a
substantial disruption to the work of the schools or infringe on the rights of
others.17 Although this standard effectively gives schools increased
authority to suppress student speech, it still protects some speech. Thus, the
kind of speech that harmed Hailee Lamberth must either be disruptive to the
school or injure another’s rights. An individual instance of name-calling,
like that to which Hailee was subjected, arguably does not rise to this level.
The first time Hailee was called “fat” or “ugly” may not have met this
standard. Depending on the circumstances, the third or fifth time a student
is called such a name may not have either. A one-time instance of namecalling may be part of a pattern of behavior that constitutes bullying, but
it may not on its own disrupt the school or injure another person’s rights.
Thus, a one-time instance is arguably protected by the First Amendment,
meaning it cannot be suppressed by the public schools, whether through
school exclusion or any other means of intervention.
Anti-bullying laws therefore raise questions both about the way the
laws call for schools to respond to the problem of bullying and whether,
given First Amendment constraints, the schools can even respond at all.
Drawing both concerns together, this Article makes a twofold argument.
First, it argues that the anti-bullying laws represent a limited response to
the complicated problem of bullying that raise First Amendment concerns
despite the deference afforded schools to suppress student speech. Second,
it contends that First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly the rationales
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1351(2) (Supp. 2013).
Infra note 93 and accompanying text.
Infra Part II.A.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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for giving schools this deference, offers ways both to reform the laws and
satisfy those First Amendment concerns.
This Article begins by providing an overview of the anti-bullying
laws. To explain how these laws constitute a narrow approach to the
problem, it summarizes the scope and effects of bullying. It then describes
how the majority of states take a punitive approach to bullying that is
focused on school exclusion.18 Part II explores the First Amendment
implications, including the doctrine on overbreadth with respect to student
speech and the deferential standards applied to schools when they act to
suppress student speech. It also examines the rationale underlying that
deference, one that is based on the Supreme Court’s particular
understandings about the work of public schools. More specifically, it
identifies the particular analytic framework for affording schools
deference to suppress student speech as dependent on both the type of
speech and its understanding of the school role in relation to that speech.
Part III then analyzes the anti-bullying laws in light of the First
Amendment doctrine on overbreadth, the deferential standards applied to
the suppression of student speech, and the rationales for that deference. It
explains how the anti-bullying laws can at times run afoul of the First
Amendment both facially on overbreadth grounds and as applied despite
the deferential standard for when schools can constitutionally suppress
student speech. In addition, it explains how the means for suppressing that
speech—often school exclusion—stand in tension with the rationale
underlying the deference given schools for suppressing it. Part IV then
explores how resolving this tension offers a way forward. It contends that
if the anti-bullying laws were better aligned with the Court’s
understanding of schools’ work, then an argument exists that schools
should receive more deference in suppressing student-bullying speech. In
doing so, it calls for adding a layer to the framework that depends on the
type of speech and schools’ role in relation to it so that the analysis
includes consideration of the means schools use for fulfilling their roles in
the bullying context. This framework, then, makes the deference given
schools dependent on not just the type of speech and the schools’ role in
relation to it, but also on the means the schools use to suppress the speech.
Under this framework, if legislatures called for schools to use means of
addressing bullying that better align with the Court’s understanding of
schools’ work, or at least did not use means such as school exclusion that
are known to be ineffective, then schools should get more deference to
suppress bullying speech. Such a framework would make the anti-bullying
laws more workable, avoiding the First Amendment problems the laws
18. Infra Part I.B.
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now face, and more effective for victims, students who bully, and schools.
Perhaps most importantly, more workable bullying laws could better
prevent tragedies like Hailee’s.
I. ANTI-BULLYING LAWS: LIMITED SOLUTIONS
FOR A COMPLEX PROBLEM
Although the problem of bullying is widespread and its effects are
complex, the anti-bullying laws require schools to respond to bullying in
a fairly limited way—by imposing discipline or consequences on the
students who bully.19 Not only do the anti-bullying laws all take a punitive
approach to bullying, the overwhelming majority of anti-bullying laws
further focus interventions on school exclusion by explicitly or implicitly
identifying it as a means to accomplish that discipline.20 Understanding
just how limited the laws’ responses to bullying are requires an
understanding of the scope and nature of the bullying problem and its
effects.
A. The Scope and Effects of the Bullying Problem
Bullying happens frequently and affects a large proportion of students
in school. In 2009-2010, bullying occurred on a weekly or daily basis in
23% of schools.21 That statistic, though, reflects the prevalence of bullying
across all age groups and grade levels.22 Disaggregating the bullying rate
by grade level indicates that the percentage of students who have been
bullied is even higher in certain grades. Perhaps unsurprisingly those
grades are middle school grades. In 2011, approximately 37% of sixth

19. In the spring of 2015, Montana became the last state to pass an antibullying law. The law defines and prohibits bullying in school. However, the law
only states that students can seek redress for bullying under any available civil or
criminal law. Bully-Free Montana Act, 2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through § 20-5-210 (West 2016)). It does not specifically
call on schools to impose consequences on the bully. Even so, as the law prohibits
bullying in school, a good case can be made that it violates school rules. As a
result, then, a school administrator could impose discipline for bullying.
20. Kentucky’s law and Idaho’s law do not call on schools to respond to
bullying because their anti-bullying laws are in their criminal codes. Therefore,
students who engage in bullying behavior can face criminal penalties. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 (West 2016).
21. Robers et al., supra note 2, at 32.
22. Id.
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grade students reported being bullied.23 In the same year, 30% of seventh
grade students and 31% of eighth grade students reported being bullied.24
When these studies discuss bullying, they identify it as taking any one
of four forms: physical, verbal, relational, and cyberbullying. Of these
forms of bullying, perhaps the one most commonly thought of as
traditional bullying is physical bullying. Physical bullying involves, as the
25
name suggests, physical attacks such as kicking, hitting, and punching.
26
Verbal bullying consists of name-calling and harmful, hurtful teasing.
Social, or relational, bullying occurs by means such as social isolation,
27
rumor spreading, and friendship manipulation. It has “the effect of
undermining social status and threatening feelings of support, security,
28
and closeness in youth relationships.” Cyberbullying, the newest form
of bullying whose rise is associated with the increased use of technology
as a form of communication, is similar to verbal and social bullying, but
29
is distinctive in its means. Cyberbullying involves the use of electronic
30
methods of communication to bully. No matter the form it takes, bullying
is distinguished from playful or even hostile teasing by a power
31
imbalance. The bully has more power than the victim and uses it against
23. Id. at 46. In some studies, these numbers are even higher. One study found
that 39% of sixth grade students reported bullying. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra
note 2, at 3.
24. Robers et al., supra note 2, at 46. Although the percentage of students
who report being bullied goes down in high school, approximately one-quarter of
students still report bullying in high school. The follow shows the percentage of
high school students who reported bullying in 2011: 26% of ninth, 28% of tenth,
24% of 11th, and 22% of 12th graders. Id.
25. Tracy E. Waasdorp & Catherine P. Bradshaw, The Overlap Between
Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying, 56 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 483, 483
(2015); Jing Wang et al., School Bullying Among US Adolescents: Physical,
Verbal, Relational, and Cyber, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 368, 369 (2009).
26. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.
27. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.
28. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. Relational bullying also tends
to be more common among girls than boys. Id. at 3.
29. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.
30. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.
31. Dewey Cornell et al., Perceived Prevalence of Teasing and Bullying
Predicts High School Dropout Rates, 105 J. EDUC. PSCYHOL. 138, 138 (2012);
Shane R. Jimerson et al., International Scholarship Advances Science and
Practice Addressing Bullying in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN
SCHOOLS 1 (Jimerson et al. eds., 2010); Dan Olweus, Understanding and
Researching Bullying: Some Critical Issues, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN
SCHOOLS 11 (Jimerson et al. eds., 2010). Scholars have worried about punishing
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the victim by way of one or more of the forms of bullying. In this sense,
then, bullying is exploitive.
Bullying also wreaks havoc on victims, and its effects range from the
relatively minor to the tragic. The academic achievement of the victims of
bullying tends to be lower than other students who have not experienced
33
bullying. Victims are also more likely to avoid school and drop out of
34
school entirely. Victims experience a number of negative psychological
35
effects as well, with increased rates of depression and anxiety.
Alarmingly, victims also have an increased sense of hopelessness. That
increased sense of hopelessness coupled with depression puts victims at
36
increased risk for suicide.
students and youth for behavior that is typically adolescent. In particular, they
have understandably raised concerns about how typical adolescent or youthful
behavior has led to involvement in the juvenile or criminal justice system. Kristin
Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color:
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383,
386–87 (2013) (arguing that the juvenile justice system treats youth of color more
harshly because it fails to recognize their behavior as a product of their
immaturity—that is, that the behavior is normal adolescent behavior). The
bullying social science researchers have turned their attention to is distinguished
from playful or even hurtful teasing by the power imbalance that is central to the
concept of bullying behavior. See Dewey Cornell and Sharmila Bandyopadhyay,
The Assessment of Bullying, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 265
(Jimerson et al. eds., 2010); Jimerson et al., supra at 2; Olweus, supra at 11.
32. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31;
Olweus, supra note 31.
33. Susan M. Swearer et al., What Can Be Done about School Bullying? Linking
Research to Educational Practice, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 38 (2012) [hereinafter
What Can Be Done About Bullying?]; Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 139.
34. What Can Be Done About Bullying?, supra note 33, at 38–39; Cornell et
al., supra note 31, at 147.
35. Hannah L. Schacter et al., “Why Me?”: Characterological Self-Blame and
Continued Victimization in the First Year of Middle School, 44 J. CLINICAL CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 446 (2014); Susan M. Swearer et al., Assessment of
Bullying/Victimization: The Problem of Comparability Across Studies and Across
Methodolgies, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 312, 323 (Jimerson et al.
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Assessment of Bullying/Victimization].
36. Rina A. Bonano & Shelley Hymel, Beyond Hurt Feelings: Investigating Why
Some Victims of Bullying Are at Greater Risk for Suicidal Ideation, 56 MERRILLPALMER Q. 420, 433 (2010). While some student suicides related to bullying make
national news, other suicides only make local news. In 2013, Rebecca Ann Sedwick,
a 12-year-old Florida girl, committed suicide by jumping off a silo at an abandoned
cement plant, and it was reported in the New York Times. Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s
Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013),
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Furthermore, studies have shown that the effects of bullying on
victims are equal to, or more severe than, child maltreatment and are
longer lasting.37 A recently published study found that a child who is
bullied continues to face negative consequences of bullying into young
adulthood.38 Many of these long-term negative consequences are similar
to those that victims of bullying experience at the time of the bullying.39
They include depression, anxiety, self-harm, suicidal ideation, and suicide
itself.40
The negative consequences of bullying are not limited to the victims.
Although perhaps less sympathetic than the victims, students who bully
also experience negative consequences that relate to their bullying
behavior.41 They are more likely to be angry, depressed, and more
aggressive than other students.42 Students who bully are also more likely
to have conduct problems43 and problems with delinquency.44 Moreover,
like victims, the bullies too have an increased incidence of depression and
suicidal ideation.45

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worrieson-web-sites.html [https://perma.cc/3G2S-WD7U]. When Hailee Lamberth
committed suicide, it was reported in local news reports. Milliard, supra note 10.
Although reporting these suicides helps spur action, the suicides are also personal
tragedies for the families of the students. As such, it seems safe to assume that some
suicides do not make the news at all.
37. E.g., Suzet T. Lereya et al., Adult Mental Health Consequences of Peer
Bullying and Maltreatment in Childhood: Two Cohorts in Two Countries, 2
LANCET PSYCHIATRY 524 (2015).
38. Id. at 529.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Assessment of Bullying/Victimization, supra note 35, at 323.
42. Id.; Susan M. Swearer et al., Internalizing Problems in Students Involved
in Bullying and Victimization: Implications for Intervention, in BULLYING IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 63, 65–66 (Dorothy L. Espelage & Susan M. Swearer eds.,
2004) [hereinafter Internalizing Problems].
43. Assessment of Bullying/Victimization, supra note 35, at 323.
44. What Can Be Done About Bullying?, supra note 33.
45. Id.; Internalizing Problems, supra note 42, at 65–66. In addition to
students who bully and students who are victims, there are also students who fall
into the category of bully-victims. Bully-victims are students who both bully and
are victims of bullying. Clayton R. Cook et al., Predictors of Bullying and
Victimization in Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta-Analytic Investigation, 25
SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 65, 76 (2010). The research on these students suggests they too
feel the complicated effects of bullying and are in need of individualized
interventions. Id. at 78–80.
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B. State Anti-Bullying Laws
Recognizing these harmful effects of bullying, in December 2010, the
Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, called the bullying problem an urgent
one and took a series of steps in response.46 The Department of Education,
in conjunction with the Departments of Health and Human Services,
Agriculture, Interior, Defense, and Justice, held a summit to study the
problem and launched a website with information about bullying.47 The
Department of Education also published guidance for states and school
districts in an effort to spur efforts addressing bullying.48 The federal
government has not been alone in calling for action to address bullying. For
years, parents, activists, and scholars, among others, have been calling on
states and schools to stem the tide of this widespread problem.49

46. Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., to Colleagues (Dec. 16,
2010), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html [https://perma
.cc/MBX9-5XHV].
47. Id.
48. The guidance provided by the United States serves as technical assistance
and outlines what it terms “key strategies” of anti-bullying laws. The key
strategies include developing a specific definition of bullying, consistent with
federal and state law, and prohibiting such conduct. It calls on states to develop
or require schools to develop procedures for reporting bullying and for
investigating and responding to reports of bullying. In responding to bullying, the
technical assistance document suggests that anti-bullying laws and policies should
describe consequences, which need to be imposed, and they should be graduated.
The document does not ignore the victim and suggests a process to refer the victim
to counseling. Id.
49. See, e.g., Sandra Cherub, Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval Signs Anti-Bullying
Legislation, L.V. REV. J. (May 20, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com
/news/nevada-legislature/nevada-gov-brian-sandoval-signs-anti-bullying-legislation
[https://perma.cc/8PXR-2XAJ]; Milliard, supra note 10; Goodno, supra note 9; Kelly
A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace Victimization on
Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J.L.
& HEALTH 155 (2012); Dan Savage, Anti-Gay Bullying Claims Another Victim, SLOG
(July 17, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2013
/07/17/anti-gay-bullying-and-hate-claims-another-victim [https://perma.cc/V5KCZGBH]; Our Mission, STOMP OUT BULLYING, http://www.stompoutbullying.org/in
dex.php/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/RC2N-VWEM] (last visited Sept. 27,
2016); October is National Bullying Prevention Month, PACER’S NAT’L BULLYING
PREVENTION CTR., http://www.pacer.org/bullying/nbpm/ [https://perma.cc/Y5BWMGTX] (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).
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Every state has heeded the call to respond to the problem of bullying
by passing anti-bullying laws.50 Despite the pervasive nature of the
bullying problem and the complexity of its effects, bullying laws often do
not call for adequate intervention. Although they do reflect an effort to
cover all forms of bullying, the laws typically fail to require schools to
intervene in more than a relatively limited way.
The definitions of bullying found in the anti-bullying laws acknowledge
that bullying, as defined in social science research, takes multiple forms.
Thus, the laws generally prohibit bullying regardless of form—physical,
written, verbal, or cyber.51 In addition, the laws outline the degree of
50. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-1–16-28B-9 (2016); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
14.33.200 (West 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2016); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 6-18-514 (West 2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (amended
by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West
2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21535.01 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-751.4 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-2 (LexisNexis 2016); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7 (West
2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28
(West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
158.150 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416.13 (2016); ME. STAT.
tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2016); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West
2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1167 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §
20-5-209 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-2137 (West 2016); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 388.121–388.1327 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2016); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7
(LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 115C-407.15 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17 (West
2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24100.3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.351 (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-33
(West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-3215 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4502 (West 2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.0832 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201 (West
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01
(West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.46 (West 2016); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West 2016).
51. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 193-F:3.
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severity that the acts must achieve to constitute bullying. In some states, a
single act is sufficient to constitute bullying under the law if it is severe
enough.52 Others states require repeated, but not necessarily very severe,
acts to meet the legal definition of bullying.53
The definitions of bullying also reflect some of the parameters of other
laws. For example, because bullying is akin to harassment, and harassment
is unlawful if it is based on a prohibited category and creates a hostile
educational environment,54 a number of anti-bullying laws include acts
that “create[] a hostile educational environment” as one definition of what
constitutes bullying.55 Some laws go even further and define a hostile
educational environment as one that is created by “substantially interfering
with a student's educational benefits, opportunities, or performance, or
with a student's physical or psychological well-being.”56
Once a student has engaged in an act or acts that constitute bullying,
the laws call for school intervention. This is where the anti-bullying laws
fail to reflect the complexity of the bullying problem and its effects. When
bullying occurs, all anti-bullying laws call for the bully to face some sort
of discipline or consequences. Of the states, 36 do not identify any
consequences or responses tailored to addressing the problem of bullying
in particular, and thus they implicitly or explicitly focus the schools’
responses on school exclusion.57 Of those 36 states, 29 either explicitly or
52. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3.
53. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D.
54. Letter from Arne Duncan, supra note 46. The prohibited categories are
race, color, national origin, sex, and disability. Id.
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18514; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d(a)(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2(a).
56. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424(a)(2)(i) (West 2016). Other
statutes, such as North Dakota’s anti-bullying statute, effectively define a hostile
education environment without using that term. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.119-17(1)(a)(i) (West 2016). The North Dakota statute provides that behavior “so
severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive that it substantially interferes with the
student’s educational opportunities” constitutes bullying. Id.; see also Letter from
Arne Duncan, supra note 46.
57. Those states are the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200(b) (West 2016); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(A)(36) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514; CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West)
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implicitly identify school exclusion as the sole or primary method of
intervention when bullying takes place.58 The other seven states’ anti(effective Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
14, § 4112D(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4) (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. §
20-2-751.4 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 280.28; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(c) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 158.150 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 380.1311 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-69 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West
2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-201(2) (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
79-267 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4; N.M. CODE R. §
6.12.7.7(c)(5) (LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13 (McKinney 2016); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 115C-407.15(6)(b)(4) (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
15.1-19-18(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 339.356 (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1A (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-16 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 496-4503 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-301 (West
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01
(West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
118.46 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West 2016). At least one
study has found that generally school culture is resistant to alternatives to school
exclusion because staff believe that problem behaviors should be punished, and
students with problem behaviors should be served in segregated settings. Linda M.
Barbara et al., Perceived Barriers and Enablers to Implementing Individualized
Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports in School Settings, 25 J. POSITIVE
BEHAVIOR INTERVENTIONS 1, 11 (2012). Thus in a state like Virginia, where the
bullying statute is part of the student discipline code, or Utah, where the bullying
statute calls for student discipline, the research suggests that schools and school
culture will lead schools to use school exclusion as the response to bullying.
58. Those states are the following: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 6-18-514; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D; FLA. STAT. ANN §
1006.147; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 280; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150;
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 121A.031; MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67; MO. ANN. STAT. §
160.775; MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-201(2); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-267;
N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C407.15; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666;
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-16; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-4503; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 570; VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01; WASH. REV. CODE ANN, §
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bullying laws both implicitly focus on school exclusion and also identify
additional, non-punitive approaches schools can take to address the effects
of bullying on the bully, victim, or both, such as referring the involved
students for counseling.59 However, the alternative steps supplement, but
do not supplant, the punishment requirement and few, if any, require direct
interventions by the schools.60 Relatively few states expressly identify
alternative forms of discipline for bullying that could supplant school
exclusion, such as the loss of privileges or extracurricular activities.61 Only

28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2; WIS. STAT. ANN. §
118.46; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312. In Washington, the statute is at best vague
about any responses schools must take when bullying happens. However, the model
policy the statute requires be developed calls for corrective measures and
contemplates those will include suspensions and expulsions because it refers to the
aggressor’s appeal rights, which apply to suspensions and expulsions. Bullying and
Harassment (HIB) Toolkit, OFF. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION,
http://www.k12.wa.us/Safetycenter/BullyingHarassment/default.aspx [https://perma.
cc/FFY5-ESWK] (last updated Apr. 13, 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
28A.600.010, 28A.600.015, 28A.600.020, 28A.600.022.
59. Those states are the following: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341; CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 48900, 48900.5 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective
Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; 24 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2. Including
Arizona in this group might constitute generosity. Arizona’s law states that
provisions must be made for protecting the health and well-being of students who
are harmed by bullying, but it limits those protections to students who are
physically harmed. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341.
60. ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341; CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 48900 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective
Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; 24 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2.
61. Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island are among them. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6 (LexisNexis
2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7(b) (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§
17:416.13; 14:40.7 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 71, § 370 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1351 (West 2016); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(7); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A)(12) (2016); 16 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-34 (West 2016).
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two states’ anti-bullying laws require that the schools take any steps to
address the effects of bullying on the victims.62
This legal landscape, with the focus on discipline responses that are
not tailored to the problem of bullying, such as school exclusion, reflects
a limited response to the complicated problem of bullying. This disparate
response calls to mind the quote from psychologist Abraham Maslow, “If
the only tool you have is a hammer, [it is tempting] to treat everything as
if it were a nail.”63 When the anti-bullying laws require schools to punish
the bully, and traditional school discipline is the only identified means for
doing so, then it is understandable that schools focus on school exclusion
in response to bullying.
1. Anti-Bullying Laws that Explicitly or Implicitly Focus on School
Exclusion
Of the 36 states that focus on punishing the bully and using school
exclusion as the primary method of punishment, only a few do so
64
explicitly. The remainder of states are more subtle, focusing on school
exclusion without specifically naming it in the anti-bullying laws. In the
few states that are explicit about school exclusion, anti-bullying laws
provide that bullying is a ground for suspension, expulsion, or some other
65
form of school exclusion. Alaska’s statute, for example, does not mince
62. Those states are South Carolina and Texas. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425
(2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342 (West 2016). South Carolina’s
protections are provided only in limited circumstances where a protective order
has been granted the victim. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425.
63. David McRaney, Maslow’s Hammer: Are We Entering a New Phase in
Anthropology?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday
.com/blog/you-are-not-so-smart/201203/maslows-hammer [https://perma.cc/BL3F3RGW].
64. Those states are Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, and Nebraska. ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 14.33.200; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 18-917A, 33-205 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-267 (West 2016).
In addition, Kentucky’s anti-bullying law is part of the state’s criminal code. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158-150 (West 2016). As bullying in Kentucky is punishable
as a misdemeanor, meaning bullying is punishable by confinement not in a
penitentiary, which would effectively involve school exclusion, the author
includes it in this category. Id. § 431.060. Idaho’s anti-bullying law is also part of
its criminal code, but the punishment does not result in confinement upon
conviction. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-111, 18-917A.
65. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-917A; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-267.
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words in this respect. It states that schools’ anti-bullying policies “must . . .
include provisions for an appropriate punishment schedule up to and
66
including expulsion.” Although Alaska’s law does not make clear what
those other appropriate punishments are, it clearly states that expulsion is
appropriate and should be considered.67 Georgia’s anti-bullying law goes
even further and leaves no room for discretion when using school exclusion
in response to bullying. Upon the third instance of bullying by a student in
grades 6 through 12, the Georgia anti-bullying law requires “such student
68
[to] be assigned to an alternative school.”
Although anti-bullying laws are less explicit in the other states,
69
discipline—often meaning school exclusion—is nonetheless present. In
these states, the anti-bullying laws all call for schools to impose “discipline”
70
or “consequences” on students when they bully. In other words, the anti66. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200.
67. Id.
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b)(1).
69. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-1, et seq. (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341
(2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (West 2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900
(West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective Jan. 1,
2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4112D (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 280 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2016); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West
2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1167 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 2016); Bully-Free Montana
Act, 2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through §
20-5-210 (West 2016)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:37-15 (West 2016); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2016); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-407.15 (West
2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.666 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356 (West 2016); 24 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-32-16 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4502 (West 2016); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201 (West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570
(West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.46 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West
2016).
70. For example, Ohio’s statute requires schools to have a “disciplinary
procedure for any student guilty of . . . bullying.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666.
Vermont’s statute calls for “consequences or appropriate remedial action.” VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 570c(5). Again, although not every statute uses the precise language
“discipline” or “consequences,” the states use similar and similarly vague, apparently
discretionary language. For example, in Washington, the model anti-bullying policy
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bullying laws in these states call for schools to discipline the bully, and by
failing to provide any potential methods for accomplishing this discipline,
the laws indicate that schools need to respond to bullying in the same way
that the schools respond to any other form of student discipline. Nationwide
statistics show that school administrators respond to serious student
71
disciplinary problems by excluding students from school. Across the
country, the number of suspensions has more than doubled since the
72
1970s. In 2011–2012, the years for which aggregate disciplinary numbers
are most recently available, there were almost 3,200,000 suspensions and
73
more than 110,000 expulsions. School exclusion is happening at such high
rates that the National School Boards Association has called the situation a
74
“crisis.” Although school discipline statistics do not disaggregate on the
calls for “corrective measures.” Featured Policies, WASH. ST. SCH. DIRECTORS’
ASS’N, http://www.wssda.org/PolicyLegal/FeaturedPolicies.aspx [https://perma.cc/
DV3G-8ULA] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (follow the “Procedure” hyperlink under
“3207–Prohibition of Harassment, Intimidation and Bullying (including
Cyberbullying)”). See also Bullying and Harassment (HIB) Toolkit, supra note 58;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.600.010, 28A.600.015, 28A.600.020, 28A.600.022.
In Wyoming, the statute prohibits bullying in school, thus making it a violation of the
school rules. It does not state specifically that students are therefore subject to
discipline, but any violation of a school rule can result in discipline, including
suspensions and expulsions. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., COMPENDIUM OF SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE 50 STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
AND UNITED STATES TERRITORIES 4111 (2016), http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov
/sites/default/files/discipline-compendium/School%20Discipline%20Laws%20and
%20Regulations%20Compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYL2-9VA3] [hereinafter
COMPENDIUM]. Indeed, some bullying laws simply direct schools to the student code
of conduct to determine the disciplinary measures that should be imposed when
students bully. Id. As noted above, although Kentucky and Idaho’s anti-bullying laws
do not call for school exclusion, the consequences for bullying there can be even more
serious than the ones required in Georgia. McRaney, supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
71. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2009, at 70 (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/7D8X-5AXT].
72. Perry & Morris, supra note 5, at 1070.
73. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 233.30, DIG. OF EDUC. STATS.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.30.asp [https://perma.
cc/EK8N-62J9] (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
74. NAT’L. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSION
CRISIS 2 (2013), https://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/0413NSBA-Out-Of-SchoolSuspension-School-Board-Policy-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7TE-R89T] (stating
that during the 2009–2010 school year, 3.3 million students were issued out-of-school
suspensions).

718

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

basis of bullying, given the increase in school exclusion as a method of
school discipline, there is little reason to think that schools will treat an
incidence of bullying any differently than they do any other school
disciplinary matter, especially when lacking any guidance in the anti75
bullying laws for responding differently. It stands to reason, then, that
even in the states that allow for schools to use their discretion in imposing
consequences or discipline when bullying occurs, schools will use the
methods of school exclusion that they increasingly have used.
Additionally, to the extent schools in these states have any guidance
with respect to how to respond to bullying, guidance is found in general
76
student discipline laws and regulations. The only methods of discipline

75. The statistics that disaggregate the rise in suspensions and expulsions do
disaggregate based on type of offense—the number of offenses in the disaggregation
is small and does not include bullying. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 233.10,
DIG. OF EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233
.10.asp [https://perma.cc/T3YE-FUH3] (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). Although it can
be argued that perhaps these numbers of suspensions and expulsions do not implicate
bullying on a large scale because the statistics do not disaggregate on the basis of
bulling, it is hard to imagine given the implicit and sometimes explicit focus on school
exclusion in the anti-bullying laws that they do not. To illustrate the go-to nature of
school exclusion in the eyes of schools, one need only look to one school’s response
to why they should not be liable for student-on-student gender-based harassment in
the case of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). There
the school argued they should not be liable for such harassment under Title IX
because then in order to prevent such liability, schools would have to then require
“nothing short of expulsion of every student accused of misconduct involving
sexual overtones.” Id. at 648 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 16, Davis v. Monroe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No. 97-843), 1998 WL 847573). The
Supreme Court made clear that such measures were not required to avoid liability
and the schools only needed to “respond . . . in a manner that is not clearly
unreasonable.” Id. at 649. That the schools argued expulsion was their only recourse
demonstrates that it serves as their go-to response when confronted with serious
student disciplinary problems like harassment, which bears a strong relationship to,
and sometimes overlaps with, bullying.
76. In part, school discipline laws single out school exclusion because they
implicate students’ procedural due process rights. In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme
Court concluded that schools cannot suspend and expel students from school
without at least some minimal due process. 419 U.S. 565, 580–81 (1975).
Following Goss, states discipline laws spell out the process required before
schools can suspend or expel students. For example, North Carolina has a
subsection of its education code devoted to school discipline procedures, but they
cover suspensions, expulsions, and subsequent readmissions. N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 115C-390.1-393 (2016). By singling out specific disciplinary measures

2017]

A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFERENCE APPROACH

719

identified in the general student discipline laws in these states are methods
77
Imagine that a principal or other school
of school exclusion.
administrator in one of these states was to consider what punishment to
use in the face of a serious case of bullying. Looking at the potential
options in the relevant state disciplinary rules, that administrator would
find school exclusion methods as the only identified options for addressing
serious student disciplinary issues. It would be reasonable for that
administrator to conclude that school exclusion is an appropriate, and
perhaps the most appropriate, response to address a serious problem.
Given the lack of alternative methods for addressing serious bullying,
school exclusion can look like the only option.
Admittedly, in some of these states that call for schools to simply
impose “discipline” or “consequences” on the bully, the anti-bullying laws
also identify some other interventions that schools could use in addition to
78
punishing the bully. However, all of these interventions are discretionary
and do not relieve schools of their responsibility to punish the bully.
Furthermore, the additional interventions identified in these nine states’
anti-bullying laws require little of the schools in terms of providing any
actual services to students. For example, in New Jersey, schools “may”
79
provide intervention services or order counseling. In California, schools
80
“may refer” the bully or victim for counseling. In Florida, schools need

without identifying any others, the laws not only follow Goss’s requirements, they
also suggest the appropriateness of school exclusion as a response.
77. All states have laws that define the meaning of certain methods of school
exclusion. The laws usually define “long-term suspension” and “expulsion,” as
well as the process required for excluding a student from school by suspension
and expulsion. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 70.
78. The states with those alternatives are Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2016);
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.9 (West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(7) (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-3 (West
2016). Including Alabama in this list is arguably generous. The Alabama statute
requires a graduated set of consequences for bullying, which could include
alternatives to school exclusion, but the statute does not explicitly call for or
require them. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(6).
80. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.9 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)).
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to have a procedure for referring victims of bullying to counseling.
Significantly, though, a referral for counseling amounts to little more than
providing the student or the student’s parents with information. It does not
mean that a victim of bullying will receive counseling. Thus, despite
language invoking alternative forms of interventions, the anti-bullying
laws in those states effectively require little or no direct intervention by
the schools other than traditional discipline, often meaning school
exclusion, for the bully.
2. Anti-Bullying Laws that Identify Alternatives to School Exclusion
Only a few states’ anti-bullying laws specifically identify some
alternative consequence for the bully that could serve as a guide for
82
schools and could supplant school exclusion as a disciplinary method.
Two additional states require schools to take affirmative steps to protect
83
the victim. In the states that identify alternative forms of discipline in
their anti-bullying laws, some single out methods such as the loss of
privileges or extracurricular activities as disciplinary methods schools
84
could use to address bullying. Others suggest a broader range of
85
possibilities. Illinois’s anti-bullying law suggests schools can respond to
bullying by providing social work services, mediation, restorative justice,
86
and skill building and counseling, among other methods. Although not
all of these options may be effective, and indeed some are not effective in
the bullying context, the laws in these states at least offer alternative—
though still bully-focused—approaches for schools to consider other than
87
school exclusion.
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4)(j).
82. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 819-2 (LexisNexis 2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7 (West 2016); IND. CODE
ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416 (2016); ME.
STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.123 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (2016);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-34 (West 2016).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425 (Supp. 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
37.0342 (West 2016).
84. Hawaii, for example, cites a range of potential consequences including loss
of privileges and parent conferences. HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6.
85. Colorado’s statute identifies mediation, restorative justice, and counseling
as options for responding to bullying. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1.
86. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7.
87. Some of the alternative methods for addressing bullying in these laws can
be counter-productive. Infra Part III.A.
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In South Carolina and Texas, the anti-bullying laws give victims
affirmative rights to an intervention addressing bullying. Specifically,
victims in South Carolina and Texas have the right to transfer schools
88
because of bullying. However, in South Carolina, that victim-transfer
89
right only exists if a court orders it. In Texas, the right is not so limited.
If a parent of a victim of bullying requests that the victim be transferred to
90
a new school, the law requires the transfer to occur.
The states that offer alternative approaches to discipline in their antibullying laws or that require schools to assist the victim represent fewer
than a quarter of the states. Of course, the punitive approach to bullying in
general, and school exclusion in particular, has its appeal. Certainly there
is value in teaching students who bully a lesson by way of discipline. If
nothing else, it teaches that the behavior is unacceptable. To the extent that
schools punish students who bully through school exclusion, the schools
91
at least theoretically stop the bullying from occurring in the short-term.
The point of this discussion is not to deny that the approach in the antibullying laws lacks some appeal. Instead, the point is simply to explain
that the approach is limited and focused on school exclusion. However,
the punitive, school-exclusion focused approach to bullying does have its
problems.
II. STUDENT SPEECH AND SCHOOLS’ AUTHORITY TO SUPPRESS IT
Not only are the anti-bullying laws limited in their response to
bullying, but the laws also often implicate the First Amendment. Much of
the bullying that occurs among students is verbal or written, including
92
electronic writings and postings. That is, most bullying constitutes
speech. One study found that verbal bullying occurred more than twice as
93
often as physical bullying. When public schools impose consequences
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425.
90. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342.
91. This effect is more dubious in the case of cyberbullying, which can occur
anywhere. Even if a bully is removed from school, the bully can still send bullying
messages electronically. If the victim receives those messages at school, then the
bullying has at least in part happened at school.
92. Wang et al., supra note 25, at 372.
93. Id. The same study found that social, or relational, bullying, which
includes behaviors such as spreading rumors, also occurs more than twice as
frequently as physical bullying. Id. In addition, 13.6% reported experiencing
cyberbullying, which occurs in electronic written form. Id. Of the students
surveyed in that study, all of whom were ages six to ten, 53.6% reported

722

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

on students who engage in bullying, the schools are often suppressing
student speech. Therefore, those consequences and the laws that allow for
94
them implicate the First Amendment. To impose any consequences for
bullying that is speech, schools then must satisfy First Amendment
constraints.
In assessing the application of the First Amendment in the public
school context, the Supreme Court has provided schools more latitude to
95
suppress student speech than other state actors. However, that latitude is
not unlimited. Laws calling for the suppression of student speech are still
subject to First Amendment limits based on overbreadth and must comply
96
with even the deferential standards for the suppression of student speech.
In describing those standards, this Part also explores the rationale for the
deference afforded schools and the analytic framework that forms that
rationale. That rationale and the framework for it serve not only an
important explanatory function, but also as a point for analysis itself.
A. Overly Broad Restrictions on Student Speech
Statutes giving schools authority to suppress student speech for
disciplinary purposes can run afoul of the First Amendment on the basis
of overbreadth.97 A law facially violates the First Amendment because of
overbreadth if “there is a ‘likelihood that the statute’s very existence will
inhibit free expression’ by ‘inhibiting the speech of third parties who are
experiencing verbal bullying, and 51.4% reported experiencing social bullying.
Id. A comparatively small percentage of students, 20.8%, reported physical
bullying. Id. Although 20% of students reporting physical bullying still represents
a large number, and even a small percentage of students experiencing physical
bullying is too many, the number pales in comparison to the number of students
who report experiencing bullying in verbal, written, or electronic form.
94. At first blush, it may seem disconcerting to think that bullying could be
protected speech at all. Certainly a reasonable reaction to speech that is as harmful
as bullying is that it cannot possibly be protected under the First Amendment.
However, bullying restrictions limit speech on the basis of its content, and the
First Amendment requires that content-based restrictions undergo strict scrutiny.
U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012); Barry McDonald, Regulating
Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 731 (2012).
95. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that school authorities may suppress speech if the speech would reasonably lead
them to “forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities”).
96. Infra Part II.A–B.
97. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)).
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not before the Court.’”98 In addition, “the overbreadth must be ‘not only
real but substantial in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”99
Before concluding a law is overbroad on these bases, a court must
determine first “whether it is susceptible to a reasonable limiting
construction” and in so doing “every reasonable construction must be
resorted to.”100
Using these standards, the Third Circuit assessed an early antibullying law in Saxe v. State College Area School District and struck down
the law prohibiting harassment in schools as overbroad and vague.101 The
law prohibited “verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or
effect of substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.”102 Students
whose Christian beliefs held homosexuality immoral and called for them
to speak out about it challenged the law.103
The Third Circuit concluded that the law was unconstitutionally
overbroad for several reasons. First, it covered unwelcomed conduct or
speech based on characteristics not protected by federal law, such as
personal characteristics like appearance, regardless of whether that speech
was political or religious.104 Second, it prohibited speech that had the
“purpose” of harassing regardless of whether it rose to the level of
harassment.105 As such, it banned what could amount to simple namecalling. Simple name-calling is protected, if “odious,” speech.106 Third, it
banned speech no matter where it occurred, including private speech that
simply “happens to occur on the school premises.”107
Nonetheless, the court also considered whether the law could be
subject to any limiting construction that might save it from being struck
down on overbreadth grounds or met the deferential standards applied to
school suppression of student speech or could be saved as applied.108 With
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
100. Id. at 215.
101. Id. at 201.
102. Id. at 202.
103. Id. at 215.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 216–17.
106. Id. at 210.
107. Id. at 216 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271 (1988)).
108. Id. at 215.
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respect to overbreadth, the court stated that even under the narrowest
construction of the law, it prohibited “(1) verbal or physical conduct (2)
that is based on one’s actual or perceived personal characteristics and (3)
that has the purpose or effect of either (3a) substantially interfering with a
student’s educational performance or (3b) creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment.”109 Because even this construction still
allowed for the suppression of speech unprotected by federal law,
irrespective of whether it rose to the level of harassment and wherever it
occurred, the court concluded that the law failed on overbreadth grounds.
The court also concluded that the law could not be saved as applied
because it did not comport with the standards for school suppression of
student speech as set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District or any of the ensuing Supreme Court cases allowing for the
suppression of certain kinds of student speech.110 Therefore, the court
struck the law down as unconstitutional.
B. The Deferential Standards for the Suppression of Student Speech by
the Public Schools
Although the Supreme Court has decided several First Amendment
cases in the school context, four of them directly address student-generated
speech. Of those four, Tinker sets the general standard and courts have
treated the rest as exceptions to that standard.111 As Saxe suggests, even
laws directing schools to suppress speech can be overbroad, but
nonetheless constitutional, if they are saved, at least as applied, by the
Tinker test or one of its exceptions set forth in its progeny. The review of
the cases that follow includes not only an analysis of the deferential
standards for the suppression of student speech, but also the bases for that
deference because they are inextricably related.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
Supreme Court famously declared that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”112 At the same time,
though, the Court made clear that those constitutional rights are not
coextensive with constitutional rights in other contexts.113 The Court’s
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 215.
See, e.g., Saxe, 240 F.3d 200.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Id.
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rationale for finding that students do not enjoy full constitutional
protections in schools lies in its understandings of the work of the schools.
The Tinker case arose in the midst of the Vietnam War. The students
in the case, John and Mary Beth Tinker, then ages 15 and 13, respectively,
and a third student, Christopher Eckhardt, then age 16, objected to the
war.114 To demonstrate their objections, the three wore black armbands to
school in violation of a school policy prohibiting the wearing of
armbands.115 As a result, the principals of their schools suspended them
until they came to school without the armbands.116 Mary Beth, John, and
Christopher appealed their suspensions on First Amendment grounds.117
The Supreme Court found that the schools violated the students’ First
Amendment rights.118 In so finding, it set forth a standard for when those
First Amendment rights could be infringed on by schools. The Court held
that schools cannot suppress student speech without “reason to anticipate
that [the speech] would substantially interfere with the work of the school
or impinge upon the rights of other students.”119 Noting that the school
cannot suppress student speech merely on the basis of an “undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance,” it found no substantial interference
with the schools’ work on the facts in Tinker and overturned lower court
decisions upholding the schools’ actions.120
That schools can suppress student speech if the schools anticipate that
it will cause a substantial disruption or impinge on other students’ rights
means that the schools have more authority to limit student speech than do
other state entities.121 Outside the school context, the government cannot
suppress speech simply because it might be disruptive.122 However, in
schools, the Court has held that students’ constitutional rights, and
specifically in Tinker their First Amendment rights, are “applied in light

114. Id. at 504.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 513–14.
119. Id. at 509.
120. Id.
121. The Supreme Court is particularly explicit about this point in the
subsequent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick, where it states the
constitutionally suppress-able lewd speech given by a student in that case “outside
the school context . . . would have been protected.” 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
122. Generally, speech cannot be suppressed unless it falls into a protected
category. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

726

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

of the special characteristics of the school.”123 Herein lies the Court’s basis
for finding that students do not enjoy the full force of the Constitution’s
First Amendment protections in school—the “special characteristics” of
school. The public schools, then, effectively have enhanced authority to
suppress student speech because of their special characteristics. Schools
can use that authority when they have “reason to anticipate that [the
speech] would substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge on the rights of other students.”124 However, anticipating these
events is a trigger for the authority’s use, not its basis. The schools’ special
characteristics provide that basis.
The Court also identified in Tinker some of what it understands those
special characteristics to be. The Court said that schools are “educating the
young for citizenship.”125 It also stated that schools are the “marketplace
of ideas” and places where students will participate in a “robust exchange
of ideas.”126 Finally, the Court made clear that this exchange of ideas is
not one that is “confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which
takes place in the classroom.”127 Instead, “[t]he principal use to which the
schools are dedicated is to accommodate students . . . for the purpose of
certain types of activities,” including “personal intercommunication” be
that “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus.”128 Thus,
in Tinker the Court made clear that it understands schools’ roles to be
broader than just academic, and that those roles justify the deference
schools have to suppress student speech.
2. The Post-Tinker Cases
The Supreme Court has decided three student speech cases since
Tinker.129 These cases, Bethel School District v. Fraser, Hazelwood
123. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. The Court has also since found that other
constitutional rights are not applied with the same force in school, including Fourth
Amendment rights. For example, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court concluded that
a student’s Fourth Amendment rights protecting them from unreasonable searches
are lesser in the school context. 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
124. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
125. Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
126. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1937)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 512–13.
129. The Court also decided two other First Amendment school case postTinker, Ambach v. Norwick and Board of Education v. Pico. However, those cases
did not involve the suppression of student speech. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick, depart from Tinker
in that the cases assess school authority to suppress a particular type or
category of speech.130 In each case, the Court found that schools have the
authority to suppress certain types of speech categorically without regard
for whether the speech would cause a substantial disruption or be injurious
to the rights of others and all for reasons relating to the work that the Court
understands schools to do and the type of speech involved.131
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court upheld the suspension
of a student, Matthew Fraser, for giving a lewd speech at school.132 Fraser
challenged his suspension on First Amendment grounds. The district court
and the Ninth Circuit found that the suspension violated his First
Amendment rights.133 The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’
decisions. It concluded that schools could suppress lewd student speech as
a categorical matter without respect to whether it could cause the schools
to anticipate a substantial disruption or be injurious to the rights of
others.134 To the point, the Court stated, “The First Amendment does not
prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and
lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school's basic
educational mission.”135
In the process, the Court again noted that students’ First Amendment
rights are different and lesser than individuals’ rights outside of school,
albeit without specifically referring to schools’ special characteristics.136
Nevertheless, to justify the categorical suppression of student lewd speech,
the Court relied on its understanding of the schools’ work. The Court said
that the purpose of public schools is “the inculcat[ion of] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”137
It also identified some of those values as it perceives them. The Court said
those values “must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and
religious views,” and they “must also take into account consideration of
the sensibilities of others.”138 In addition to elaborating on some of the
130. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
131. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86 (obscene language); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
272–73 (school-sponsored speech); Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97 (language
reasonably understood to encourage illegal drug use).
132. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675.
133. Id. at 676.
134. Id. at 687.
135. Id. at 685.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)).
138. Id.
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specific values schools “must” be teaching, the Court also identified other
teaching functions of schools.139 It stated that society has an interest in
having students learn “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior”
because “a democratic society requires consideration for the personal
sensibilities . . . of other[s].”140
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a school
principal deleted two stories from a school newspaper, one about student
pregnancy and the other about divorce.141 Three student newspaper staff
members challenged the deletion of the stories, arguing the action violated
their First Amendment rights.142 In upholding the actions of the principal
against the First Amendment challenge, the Court relied on a distinction
between when the First Amendment requires schools to tolerate student
speech and when it requires schools to promote or endorse it.143 In the case
of the latter category of speech, the Court concluded that schools have
even more authority under the First Amendment to suppress student
speech than when the school is merely tolerating student speech.144 As
long as the suppression of speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” it does not
offend the First Amendment.145 Finding that the deletion of the articles in
the school newspaper met that standard, the Court held the principal’s
actions constitutional.146 Here too, the Court asserted the notion that “the
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’ and
must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”147 Kuhlmeier thus reflects the significance of this rationale
regarding the characteristics and work of the public schools on the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding school authority to suppress student speech.
The Court’s most recent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick, is
perhaps more famously known as the “bong hits for Jesus” case because
the student in the case, Joseph Frederick, held up a banner that said
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while attending the Olympic torch relay with his

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S 260, 263–65 (1988).
142. Id. at 264.
143. Id. at 271–73.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 273.
146. Id. at 275–76.
147. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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classmates during the school day.148 When the principal, Deborah Morse,
told Frederick to take the banner down, he refused and was suspended.149
Frederick appealed the suspension, arguing it violated his First
Amendment rights.150 The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed, though its
holding was narrow.151 The Court determined that schools are allowed
under the First Amendment “to restrict student expression that they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”152
In Morse, the Court was explicit about the nature of schools’ work and
its relationship to the deference the schools receive to categorically
suppress a particular type of student speech—student drug-promoting
speech.153 The Court stated that the school’s role and “governmental
interest in stopping student drug abuse” more specifically allows schools
to prohibit speech like Frederick’s.154 The Court noted that both Congress
and “thousands of school boards throughout the country—including
[Frederick’s]—have adopted policies aimed at” educating students about
the dangers of drug use.155 Those policies coupled with strong evidence of
the reality and seriousness of student drug abuse led the Court to view
schools as having a role in preventing drug use and in “working to protect
those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”156 Thus,
while the holding and rationale are limited, the Court still indicated that
when a danger, like drug abuse, is real and pervasive, and when local and
federal governments have adopted strong policies aimed at addressing the
problem, it understands schools as having a legitimate role in working to
address the problem and therefore can suppress student speech as a means
of fulfilling it.
C. Deconstructing Deference: The Relationship Between the Supreme
Court’s Understanding of Schools’ Work and Public Schools’ Deference
to Suppress Student Speech
Morse, similar to Fraser and Tinker before it, demonstrates that the
Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work is a critical component
of its rationale for affording schools deference in suppressing student
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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speech.157 However, the schools’ role is not the only piece of the analysis
that gives rise to this deference. These student speech cases, with the
possible exception of Kuhlmeier, follow a particular analytic framework
that involves not just a reliance on a particular understanding of schools’
work, but also an analysis of the schools’ role with respect to a general or
a particular category of speech. That relationship provides the justification
for the amount of deference that schools receive to suppress the speech.158
Thus, in Tinker, the Court analyzed student speech that expressed a
viewpoint—any viewpoint—and schools’ role, as the Court understood it,
with respect to students’ expression of views. The Court said that schools’
roles generally involved educating students for participation as citizens in
the democratic political system.159 To this end, the Court noted that
classrooms serve as a marketplace for ideas—places where students can
exchange ideas and express views just as citizens debate politics.160 In
Tinker, the Court acknowledged that to carry out this teaching schools also
157. This analysis regarding the Court’s basis for giving deference to schools
builds upon other work analyzing deference more generally. Paul Horwitz, in his
piece providing, among other things, a taxonomy of deference, notes that the
Supreme Court has justified deference to schools on the basis of the “expertise of
educators.” Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1061, 1088 (2008) (arguing for the need to fully understand deference and how it is
used in order to recognize how it has been misused). See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 455–58
(1999). The analysis here further deconstructs the basis for the deference given to
schools and argues that the general expertise of educators alone does not justify it,
but their expertise as related to particular work the Court understands them to do.
158. In this context, the Court has consistently found that schools are, as James
Ryan has put it, unique and thus the need latitude to suppress student speech.
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Schools, 86 VA. L. REV., 1335, 1342–43
(2000). In so identifying the Court’s conception of schools, Ryan also analyzes
how and why it is not always the case that the Court treats schools as unique. That
is, in some contexts the Court does not give schools deference to suppress student
rights. Ryan cites Establishment Clause cases as an example of when student
rights are as protected in school than they would be outside of school. Id. at 1380.
Ryan argues the Court has distinguished between schools’ academic and social
functions and contends the Court gives schools more authority to carry out their
academic functions. Id. at 1384–85. When they are carrying out social functions,
Ryan argues that the Court allows schools no added authority. Id.
159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 512
(first quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); and then
quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76–
77 (1979)).
160. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
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need to maintain order.161 Thus, the Court balanced two of the schools’
roles—their role in maintaining order in school and their role in teaching
students to participate as citizens in the democracy—with the type of
speech—generally expressive speech. Given the type of speech and the
Court’s understanding of the schools’ role in relation to it, the Court
allowed schools to suppress student speech only if schools could anticipate
that it would substantially disrupt their work or be injurious to the rights
of others. Tinker also provided the general standard for the suppression of
student speech because the case did not analyze a particular type of speech
or expression. Rather, it simply addressed student expression in general.
Thus, courts have applied the Tinker standard as the general standard in
student speech cases.162 The Court’s subsequent student speech cases,
which assess school suppression of particular types of speech, serve as
exceptions to the Tinker standard.163
In Fraser, the Court described two specific school functions as they
related to a particular category of speech, lewd student speech, and used that
relationship as a basis for giving schools a certain amount of deference,
categorical deference, to suppress that lewd speech. First, the Court
explained that schools provide instruction in “fundamental values of ‘habits
and manners of civility.’”164 It went further to state specifically that the
values schools must teach are “tolerance of divergent political and religious
views” and “consideration of the sensibilities of others.”165 Second, the
Court also said that society has an interest in schools teaching students “the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”166 Consequently, the Court
concluded that schools have the authority to suppress all lewd speech by
students.167 The nature and necessity of teaching these values and skills in
addition to the role of schools, given the type of speech, justifies the
deference to suppress the student speech as a categorical matter, irrespective
of whether it is disruptive or injurious.
Similarly, in Morse, the Court identified a particular role for schools as
it relates to a particular category of speech—drug-promoting speech—that
justified deference to schools to suppress it categorically.168 In the context
of the problem of illegal drug use, the Court identified schools as having

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Infra note 234 and accompanying text.
Supra Part II.B.2.
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007).
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a protective role over students.169 It stated that schools have this role
because of three factors, one involving the nature of the drug problem and
two involving the policy response to it.170 First, the drug problem was
widespread.171 Second, the federal government had policies placing
responsibility for combatting the drug problem on schools.172 Third, local
school districts had also all developed policies to combat the drug
problem.173 As schools have this protective function in the context of the
problem of illegal drug use, the Court concluded that schools are to be
given the deference to categorically suppress a particular type of speech—
drug-promoting speech—without regard for whether it might cause a
disruption in school or injure another’s rights.
Thus, a strong relationship exists between the Court’s understanding
of schools’ work vis-à-vis the type of student speech and the deference it
gives schools to suppress that student speech. Although the Court has
never prescribed any particular role for the schools, and arguably can
never do so, the Court’s understanding of schools’ roles as they relate to
general or specific types of student speech provides the basis for the
amount of deference schools receive to suppress that speech. Therefore, in
these student speech cases, the Court not only adopts this framework in
which the deference afforded the schools to suppress speech depends on
the type of speech and the schools’ relationship to it, but in doing so the
Court also reflects its conceptions about the work of schools, which can
itself serve as a point for analyzing laws allowing or calling for the
suppression of student speech.174

169. Id. at 408.
170. Id. at 407–08.
171. Id. at 407.
172. Id. at 408.
173. Id.
174. This analysis would be different, of course, if the Court had only indicated
what the First Amendment permits schools to do, but said nothing about what schools
do. In some instances, even in the cases in which the Court makes unambiguous
statements about the role of schools, the Court also uses equivocal language about the
work of schools. In Fraser, for example, the Court concludes that the First
Amendment “does not prevent school officials from determining that to permit a
vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the school’s basic educational mission”
and thus the schools can prohibit it, but the Court does not frame doing so as a function
it understands to be an elemental piece of schools’ work. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). Elsewhere in Fraser, though, the Court does not equivocate
and thus ties its understanding of schools’ work with their categorical deference to
suppress lewd student speech. Id. at 678, 681.
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III. EXPOSING THE FLAWS: ANALYZING THE ANTI-BULLYING
LAWS IN LIGHT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Analyzing the anti-bullying laws in light of the First Amendment
proscriptions on overbreadth, the deferential standards for school suppression
of student speech, and the rationale underlying that deference reveals the laws
are at times arguably unconstitutional or problematic on all fronts. At least
some of the laws give way to an argument that they are unconstitutionally
overbroad. In some instances, if applied to bullying, they would be
unconstitutional as applied under even the deferential Tinker standard. Almost
none, if any, align with the Court’s understanding of the schools’ work that
underlies that deference with their limited, almost total, focus on school
exclusion.
A. Anti-Bullying Laws that are Arguably Unconstitutionally Overbroad
on Their Face
Many of the anti-bullying laws define bullying by capturing the forms
it can take and the effect it has.175 In what is likely an effort to cover the
maximum amount of bullying and despite an effort to recognize the
strictures of harassment law, at least some of the anti-bullying laws
resemble very closely the law found unconstitutionally overbroad in
Saxe.176 For example, Rhode Island’s anti-bullying law prohibits any
“written, verbal, or electronic expression or physical act or gesture . . . that
causes physical or emotional harm to the student.”177 The law goes on to
state that “the expression, physical act or gesture may include, but is not
limited to, an incident or incidents that may be reasonably perceived as
being motivated by . . . any . . . distinguishing characteristic.”178 Thus, in
Rhode Island, as with the Pennsylvania law in Saxe, the law arguably
prohibits mere name-calling about characteristics that are not protected by
federal law because calling someone a name like “ugly” is an expression
and arguably about a distinguishing characteristic.179 Although, as the
175. See supra Part I.
176. For example, Kansas’s anti-bullying law states “any intentional gesture
or any intentional written, verbal, electronic or physical act or threat either by any
student . . . [h]arming a student or staff member, whether physically or mentally.”
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(a)(1) (West 2016).
177. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-33 (West 2016).
178. Id.
179. Compare Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202–03 (3d
Cir. 2001) (finding a school harassment policy unconstitutional because there is
no categorical First Amendment exception for harassment or odious speech), with
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Third Circuit noted in Saxe, these sorts of expression may be “odious,”
that does not make them suppressible.180 The law also prohibits that speech
regardless of whether it rises to the level of harassment or any particular
level of harm.181 As the law only requires the expression to cause
emotional harm, without identifying that the expression even amounts to
any particular degree of harm, the law also does not protect against
harassment or expression that would deprive the object of any educational
benefits.182 Because it prohibits the expression anywhere on school
premises,183 the law also prohibits even private expression in the hallways
between classes. As such, the law meets the criteria set forth in Saxe for
finding that Pennsylvania law overbroad. Further, the law is not saved by
any limiting construction because on its face, the law allows for the
suppression of “any” expression causing any amount of harm wherever it
occurs.
Similarly, Minnesota’s anti-bullying law prohibits any “harming”
conduct, including electronic written expression, that is directed at a
student based on a characteristic of that student.184 Thus, it also prohibits
expression that is not protected by federal law, that does not rise to the
level of harassment or deprive a student of educational benefit, and that is
privately conducted in places such as outside of class and in the hallways.
In other words, the law also prohibits name-calling, such as calling another
student “ugly.” As such, both Minnesota’s and Rhode Island’s antibullying laws could arguably be said to be unconstitutional on their face
in light of the analysis applied to a similar law in Pennsylvania.
Minnesota’s law is also not rendered constitutional by any limiting
construction because no reading of the law avoids the suppression of “any”
harming conduct no matter how harmful or where it occurs. Although Saxe
is one of the few cases analyzing a harassment or anti-bullying law for
overbreadth and thus its reasoning might not be applied across the circuits,
it nonetheless supports the argument that some of the anti-bullying laws
arguably violate the First Amendment.185
16 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-33 (prohibiting in its anti-bullying law “a
written, verbal or electronic expression . . . directed at a student that causes
physical or emotional harm to the student”).
180. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206.
181. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-33.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016).
185. See also Smith v. Mt. Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Mich.
2003) (concluding a policy prohibiting “verbal” assaults in school violates the
First Amendment on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness).

2017]

A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFERENCE APPROACH

735

B. Anti-Bullying Laws that Could Violate the Tinker Standard as Applied
Some of the anti-bullying laws might be, as Saxe suggests, saved by
Tinker. If in the application the anti-bullying laws prohibited expression
that could reasonably be said to have caused a school to anticipate a
substantial disruption or injury to the rights of others, then the First
Amendment might be satisfied.186 Yet, another flaw in the laws is exposed,
which could, in conjunction with the limitations on what the laws call for
schools to do, explain how the anti-bullying law in place in Nevada when
Hailee Lamberth was bullied did not protect her. The Tinker standard does
not allow schools to punish all bullying.
Recall that in the case of Hailee Lamberth the bullying involved
individual and repeated incidences of name-calling, including “fat” and
“ugly.”187 Students called her these names at one time and then again at
another time and repeated this behavior over a period of time. No single
incident of calling Hailee fat or ugly likely rose to the level of causing a
substantial disruption to the work of the school or was injurious to Hailee’s
rights. The bullying that Hailee experienced consisted of micro-aggressions,
none of which, if individually suppressed by the school, could meet the
Tinker standard. It simply strains credulity to argue that any one instance of
these micro-aggressions caused a substantial disruption in school. Calling
Hailee “ugly” one time might have upset her, but it is hard to make the case
that such a one-time instance substantially disrupted the work of the school.
Only in the aggregate did that name-calling substantially disrupt Hailee’s
education by causing her suicide and therefore the work of the school.
Similarly, neither could those individual instances of name-calling be said
to have injured Hailee’s rights. First, that standard is vague, as it does not
make clear whether the rights injured must be recognized legal rights or
some other measure of rights. Whatever those rights were, any one-time
instance of calling Hailee a name, while hurtful to her feelings, can hardly
be said to have hurt her rights, however those rights might be defined.188
Yet, for the school to have intervened to protect Hailee when she was called
“fat” at any one time, it would have had to meet one of those standards for
the intervention to be constitutional. As such, the school probably could not
have disciplined any one instance of a student calling Hailee an expletive
and met the Tinker standard. Thus, Hailee’s school could not have

186. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
187. Milliard, supra note 10; see also discussion supra Introduction; Part III.B.
188. For a thoughtful analysis of the problems with the injurious to the rights of
other standard and potential ways to resolve them see generally McDonald, supra
note 94.
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intervened after any one instance of bullying without offending the First
Amendment.
However, that has not stopped the lower courts from applying the Tinker
standard in the bullying context to the opposite conclusion.189 When they
have done so, the effort is, as one commentator has pointed out, at least
sometimes forced.190 The lower courts’ decisions about whether the bullying
speech should have been suppressed seems to rest on the courts’ views about
whether the behavior should have been punished as opposed to whether the
speech gave schools reason to anticipate a substantial disruption in school
or injury to the rights of others.191 These kinds of reaches of logic should
not give solace to schools hoping to address bullying without violating the
First Amendment. That the courts have at times engaged in these logical
leaps to find schools’ suppressions of student speech constitutional should
not suggest that the courts have satisfied the Constitution; rather, these
results only provide evidence showing that the schools have found a court
willing to so conclude on scant evidence or reasoning.
C. Anti-Bullying Laws that Stand in Tension with Deference Rationales
The anti-bullying laws are problematic on still another level. The laws
do not align with any of the work the Court understands schools to do and
that serve as the justification, in conjunction with the type of speech, for
any level of deference the schools receive to suppress student speech.192
By focusing heavily on school exclusion either implicitly or explicitly, the
work that anti-bullying laws call for schools to do, viewed in light of
relevant, decades-long social science research, does not teach students to
participate as citizens in the democracy, educate them on behavioral
norms, or protect them. At times, the work of school exclusion does the
189. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. Although many bullying–First
Amendment cases involve student speech off-campus, not all do. And not all find
that the Tinker standard is satisfied. For example, in Glowacki v. Howell Public
School District, a federal district court in Michigan considered whether a onetime, in-class instance of student speech disparaging gay people was bullying and
whether it was protected under the First Amendment. No. 2:11-cv-15481, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960 (E.D. Mich. 2013). It concluded that the speech was
subject to First Amendment protection. Id. at *27.
190. McDonald, supra note 94, at 751–52.
191. Id. at 752.
192. It is worth noting here that schools and school administrators have long
struggled with trying to find alternatives to school exclusion. The issue for schools,
students, and policy makers is, to put it mildly a hard one. See, e.g., Christopher J.
Ferguson, Does Suspension Work?, TIME (Dec. 5, 2012), http://ideas.time.com
/2012/12/05/does-suspending-students-work/ [https://perma.cc/E769-V33Z].
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opposite, making the bullying worse.193 As such, even when the laws
arguably do not violate the Constitution, they allow schools deference to
suppress student speech to no end or the end of exacerbating bullying.194
Although the Court has tied varying levels of deference to the schools’
role as it relates to the type of speech—sometimes allowing for the
categorical suppression of speech and other times not—the work the antibullying laws call for schools to do stands in tension with all these roles.195
193. A superficial assessment of the anti-bullying laws might lead to the
conclusion that they do comport with the functions embodied in the Supreme
Court’s conception of schools even though they primarily call for the limited
response of school exclusion. Removing the bully from school and from
interaction with the victim in school might seem to prevent bullying from
happening and thus protect the victim. That allows the schools to teach the other
students who remain in school to learn to become citizens who participate in the
democracy and the values and behavioral norms attendant to that role. What this
analysis fails to recognize is that the bully is learning nothing while out of school
and then generally comes back to school. Even expulsions, the form of school
exclusion that removes students from school for the longest period of time, allow
for students to return to schools. To take just one example of how a statute
contemplates a student returning to school, North Carolina, where after 180 days
of a 365-day suspension or expulsion, students can request readmission. N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-390.12 (West 2016). It also fails to consider that
cyberbullying happens everywhere. Thus a bully excluded from school may very
well not stop bullying the victim even while the victim is in school. Something
more than a cursory assessment is required to determine whether the bullying
laws, with their focus on punishment in general and school exclusion in particular,
comport with the Supreme Court’s conception of the proper role of schools.
194. This situation is particularly troubling given the increased authority many
schools have under the anti-bullying laws, for example, to monitor students online
and their electronic activity whenever and wherever they are. This problem was
addressed more fully in Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The
Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying
Laws, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 63 (2014) (calling for limits on school
surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity).
195. While the discussion that follows about the nature of the anti-bullying
interventions largely called for by the anti-bullying laws could at least
theoretically apply to the use of school exclusion generally, the use of school
exclusion does not always or even mostly implicate the First Amendment in the
way it does in the context of bullying. Further, although the Supreme Court has
tolerated, even condoned, the use of school exclusion even in First Amendment
cases, it has done so based on the idea that the suppression of speech by way of
school exclusion allows schools to achieve the work it understands the to do. For
example, in Fraser, the Court found the suspension of a student for giving a lewd
speech appropriate because, among other things, suspending a student for a lewd
speech, according to the Court, helped teach the boundaries of socially appropriate
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1. School Exclusion: Denying Participation, Teaching Intolerance
and Inappropriate Behaviors, and Exposing Victims to Harm
The nature of school exclusion by way of suspensions and expulsions
stands in tension with the Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work.
By nature, school exclusion by suspension, expulsion, and grouping students
removes students from the learning environment largely or entirely.196 As
such, schools cannot teach students anything while they are so excluded, let
alone teach students how to participate in the democracy or the value of
tolerance. Although excluding the bully from school may allow the victims to
learn their role as citizens temporarily without being bullied in school, the
bully, as noted above, eventually returns to school. Even this temporary bullyfree learning is questionable, as a bully can continue to torment a victim using
electronic means throughout a period of suspension or expulsion.
Excluding a student from school because of bullying does send the
message that the behavior is not acceptable. However, communicating that
bullying is unacceptable by way of school exclusion teaches only that the
particular bullying behavior is inappropriate. It does not teach any
concomitant appropriate behavior. As such, school exclusion by suspension

behavior, among other things. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681
(1986). When school exclusion means grouping students who misbehave
together—either in an in-school suspension setting or in an alternative school
setting—social science research has shown that students reinforce each other’s
negative behaviors or learn new negative behaviors. Catherine P. Bradshaw,
Preventing Bullying through Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports
(PBIS): A Multitiered Approach to Prevention and Integration, 52 THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 288, 293 (2013). See also infra note 197 and accompanying text. Other
research has also shown that for students to learn socially appropriate behavior,
they need the support of school. See also Mary Gifford-Smith et al., Peer
Influence in Children and Adolescents: Crossing the Bridge from Developmental
to Intervention Science, 33 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 255, 265 (2005);
Brea L. Perry & Edward W. Morris, Suspending Progress: Collateral
Consequences of Exclusionary Punishment in Public Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV.
1067, 1070 (2014).
196. Grouping students who bully together might happen in a couple of
different ways. It could happen when a school sends students who bully to inschool suspension (“ISS”) where they sit in a segregated classroom with other
students who are being disciplined, some of whom may also have engaged in
bullying. Another way students who bully might be grouped together could be
when a school sends them to an alternative school as a punishment for bullying.
In such a setting they also would be educated exclusively alongside other students
who have been disciplined. Gifford-Smith et al., supra note 195, at 260.
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or expulsion does not teach students who bully behavioral norms or the
line between socially appropriate and inappropriate behavior.
Similarly, the effects of school exclusion in the bullying context stand
in tension with the Court’s conception of the work of the schools. Social
scientists have studied the use of suspensions or expulsions as a method
for addressing bullying and found that its effects are counterproductive.197
This research reveals that suspending or expelling students who bully from
school actually aggravates bullying198 and can result in increased
recidivism.199 Social science research also shows that the effects of
grouping students who bully together are counterproductive to preventing
and addressing bullying and thus to work of the schools as the Supreme
Court understands it.200 When students who bully are grouped together in
these ways, they reinforce each other’s negative behaviors, and they learn
new negative behaviors from each other.201 Recidivism is also associated
with this form of school exclusion. Thus, the effect of grouping students
is to facilitate the learning of intolerance and new socially inappropriate
behaviors as well as to further subject victims to harm.202 Therefore, this
intervention method also does not protect victims or in any way address
the harmful effects of bullying.
Using methods that could potentially result in more bullying allows,
or even encourages, students to engage in behaviors that are antithetical to
participation as citizens in the democracy, teaching students the value of
tolerance and protecting them. Students who bully do not participate; they

197. See Bradshaw, supra note 195. This article summarizes the literature and
research on some bullying interventions. Citing at least three research articles, it
makes the point that “there is limited evidence that [mandatory suspensions] are
effective in curbing aggressive or bullying behavior.” Id.; Susan P. Limber,
Implementation of the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program in American
Schools: Lessons Learned from the Field, in BULLYING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
351, 362 (Dorothy L. Espelage & Susan M. Swearer eds., 2004). This article also
summarizes the research on bullying interventions and, citing still different
articles, comes to the same conclusion regarding school exclusion as does
Bradshaw. School exclusion generally—by suspension, expulsion, placement in
an alternative setting, or otherwise—has been found to aggravate behavioral
problems in children. Gifford-Smith et al., supra note 195, at 260.
198. See Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 293; Limber, supra note 197, at 362.
199. Perry & Morris, supra note 5. Thus, while social science research does
not preclude the use of suspensions and expulsions entirely, it cautions that its use
should be rare. Limber, supra note 197, at 362.
200. Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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dominate.203 School exclusion at best allows and at worst encourages the
intolerance that is elemental to allowing bullying to continue by permitting
students to learn new, negative, and arguably intolerant behaviors. Finally,
school exclusion instead exposes the victim to more harm because it has
been shown to increase recidivism and worsen the bullying.
2. Peer-to-Peer Interventions: Exposing the Victims to Harm Without
Teaching Tolerance or the Line Between Appropriate and
Inappropriate Behavior
Even when the anti-bullying laws deviate from their focus on various
methods of school exclusion and identify alternative methods of
intervention, some of the alternative methods do not align with the
Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work. Specifically, peer-topeer interventions, which are identified as alternative interventions in
some states’ anti-bullying laws, are by their nature and effects antithetical
to the Court’s view of schools.204 The nature of these interventions is to
bring together the bully and victim in mediation or to engage in restorative
justice. In doing so, these methods fail to consider the power differential
at issue in bullying.205 As previously discussed, bullying is distinguishable
from teasing, even mean teasing, and other kinds of negative or hurtful
behaviors by power.206 A bully has power that he or she uses against the
victim.207 Peer-to-peer interventions, such as mediation and restorative
justice, assume the lack of such a power differential.208 As a result, these
methods can be counterproductive, causing additional victimization of the
student who has been or is being bullied.209 Therefore, peer-to-peer

203. In the case of bully-victims, the students both dominate at times and at
others do not. Internalizing Problems, supra note 42, at 65–66; Cook, supra note
45, at 76–80.
204. For example, Illinois’s anti-bullying law, while laudable in its effort to
identify and thereby guide schools to use alternative forms of intervention to
address bullying, includes the use of some of these peer-to-peer methods. Supra
notes 86 and accompanying text.
205. Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292–93.
206. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31, at 11.
207. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31, at 11.
208. See Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292–93; see also Maria M. Ttofi &
David P. Farrington, Effectiveness of School-Based Programs to Reduce Bullying:
A Systematic and Meta-Analytic Review, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 27,
43 (2010).
209. See supra Part III.B.
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methods do not protect the victim. Rather, they give the bully a way to
harm the victim further.210
IV. A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFERENCE APPROACH TO REFORM
Although anti-bullying laws can at times violate the First Amendment
on multiple fronts, that does not mean that no anti-bullying law can pass
constitutional muster. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of the anti-bullying
laws in light of the Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work
serves as a way forward. If schools better aligned their work with the work
the Court understands schools to do by, at the very least, eliminating
school exclusion as a response to bullying except in rare circumstances,
then an argument exists that schools should have more deference to
suppress student speech reasonably deemed bullying speech. Under such
a framework, schools should have categorical deference to suppress
student-bullying speech. Having such deference would avoid the pitfalls
attendant to the use of the Tinker standard. Tying that deference
specifically to speech that is bullying, meaning speech that involves the
exploitation of a power differential between students, would work to avoid
facial challenges based on overly broad speech restrictions in the antibullying laws. For, as the Third Circuit indicated in Saxe, satisfying the
deferential school speech standards can insulate even overly broad laws

210. That anti-bullying laws almost all stand in tension with the work that the
Court understands schools to do and that understanding justifies the deference
schools receive to suppress. This point could support an argument that at least in
the context of suppressing bullying speech, schools may not be not entitled to
deference. That is, that the suppression of student-bullying speech by school
exclusion should be treated with no more deference than any other state actor
would receive in suppressing speech outside the school context because the
rationale supporting that deference does not apply. This argument might have
some merit at least with respect to the actions of an individual school, if it could
be shown that the school’s actions so defied the rationale for deference that the
deference was not warranted. To succeed, though, this argument would have to
survive political pressures attendant to what might be considered effectively
limiting schools’ authority to suppress student-bullying speech. Although
political in nature, that argument might sway courts, particularly those that the
Court already strains to find in favor of schools’ suppression of student speech.
See Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292; see also Ttofi & Farrington, supra note
208, at 43. Setting those arguments aside, recognizing and resolving this tension
between the Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work and the work the
anti-bullying laws call for schools to do offers a way to also resolve the potential
First Amendment problems with the anti-bullying laws.
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from being found unconstitutional as applied.211 The starting point,
though, would involve amending the anti-bullying laws so that the laws
better aligned with the work the Court conceives of schools as doing,
which in turn raises the questions of whether such interventions exist and
what they are.
A. Bullying Interventions that Align with the Supreme Court’s
Understanding of Schools’ Work in its Student Speech Cases
Just as social science research offers insights into the ways that some
bullying interventions are counterproductive, it also offers insight regarding
interventions that are effective. Understanding how these methods work to
address bullying reveals how anti-bullying laws could better align, in
varying ways, with the Court’s conception of schools.
Chief among these methods are graduated interventions that involve
the family and community, as well as the school. For example, social
science researchers have studied the Positive Behavioral Interventions and
Supports (“PBIS”) method. PBIS is a non-curricular, three-tiered, and
school-wide system of interventions designed to “achieve behavior change
in schools.”212 Tier One is universal, meaning the interventions apply to
all students.213 Tier Two involves selective interventions for smaller
groups of students who either have behavioral problems despite Tier One
interventions or who have suffered as victims of bullying and thus need
more specialized interventions.214 In the bullying context, this might
involve “social skills training for . . . children at risk for becoming
involved in bullying” or counseling for the victim.215 Tier Three
interventions are individual and more intensive interventions directed at
students identified as a bully or victim.216 PBIS when applied generally
has been found to reduce behavioral problems in school and thus has been
recommended by social scientists as an intervention for bullying.217 Other
similarly tiered responses have also resulted in significant reductions in
bullying in schools.218 The tiered Olweus method developed by Professor
211. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 (3d Cir. 2001).
212. Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 289. PBIS is also called Schoolwide
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (“SWPBIS”). Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 290.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 289.
218. Limber, supra note 197, at 354. Discipline is not left out as a possible
effective method for intervention in the social science research. Ttofi & Farrington,
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Dan Olweus, a psychologist who has studied bullying for decades, has also
resulted in significant reductions in bullying.219 The social–ecological
method, which calls for multi-level approaches to bullying, including
involvement of others outside the school, such as family, has also led to
reductions in bullying.220
If these methods are reducing behavioral problems in schools, the
methods are teaching students behavioral norms and tolerance of others.
The methods are also preventing students from being excluded from
school because they are behaving better and so can learn to participate in
school and in the democracy. If less bullying is taking place, then fewer
students are being victimized. Not only do they protect students, the
methods also offer ways to intervene to address the negative effects of
bullying when it does happen. In all of these ways, these methods would
have schools approach bullying interventions in ways that align with the
Supreme Court’s view of schools’ roles and address more fully the
complicated effects of bullying than the anti-bullying laws do now.
Despite their benefits, though, researchers have acknowledged that the
methods can be challenging to implement because of their comprehensive,
multi-level nature.221
Fortunately, social science research has also found that less intensive
methods of addressing bullying also work. Foremost among these methods
is increasing supervision in areas where students are typically
unsupervised.222 Students often feel the least safe from bullying in these
areas, including bathrooms, hallways, and playgrounds.223 Increasing the
supervision in these areas can be an effective method for reducing

supra note 208, at 45. The type of discipline matters. Social scientists call for
discipline to come in a range of options, such as serious talks, a trip to the principal’s
office on the lower end of the range, or loss of privileges on the higher end of the
range. See id. Although social science research indicates that schools can and should
have these kinds of disciplinary methods at their disposal, they still pointedly find
that school exclusion should at best rarely be used as one of those methods.
Limber, supra note 197, at 362.
219. Limber, supra note 197, at 354.
220. Jun Sung Hong & Dorothy L. Espelage, A Review of Research on
Bullying and Peer Victimization in School: An Ecological System Analysis, 17
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 311, 318 (2012); What Can Be Done About
Bullying?, supra note 33, at 42.
221. See Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 293–94.
222. Tracy Vaillancourt, et al., Places to Avoid: Population-Based Study of
Student Reports of Unsafe and High Bullying Areas at School, 25 CAN. J.
PSYCHOL. 40, 49–50 (2010).
223. Id. at 50.
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bullying.224 It also opens new avenues and opportunities for teachers to
address bullying as it is about to happen and teach students tolerance of
others and how to behave appropriately in the context of school. It offers
a way for schools to embody the role the Court understands them to play
by giving them a way to protect students from bullying.
Social science researchers have also found that teaching parents about
bullying and how to address it is an effective part of bullying programs.225
Training teachers and staff at schools on recognizing bullying and methods
for effectively addressing bullying also helps to combat the problem.226
This recognition is a necessary precursor to teaching students the line
between inappropriate and appropriate behavior, specifically that bullying
is inappropriate behavior that conflicts with the value of tolerance. It is
also a necessary precursor to protecting victims, as a school cannot protect
a victim from something it does not recognize is happening.
However, the bullying laws, with rare exceptions, do not identify these
methods for intervening in bullying.227 By preventing bullying before it
happens, schools help to teach students the line between appropriate and
inappropriate behavior. By not excluding or segregating students who
bully and instead using other methods for addressing bullying, schools
teach tolerance and allow students to learn to participate as citizens. By
working better to end bullying and address its negative effects, schools
help protect the victim and offer a more comprehensive approach to the
complicated problem of bullying. Instead, the anti-bullying laws focus on
school exclusion.228 If the laws did use some method other than school
exclusion or other interventions found to be ineffective by social science
literature, they would go a long way to avoiding the tension that now exists
between the Supreme Court’s view of schools’ role and the role the
bullying laws have schools play.
B. Amending the Bullying Laws to Align Deference Rationales and the
Supreme Court’s Understanding of Schools’ Work
Legislatures should take heed of the Court’s understanding of schools’
roles and use that understanding and social science research as a guide for
amending anti-bullying laws to better address bullying. Legislatures should
224. Id.; Ttofi & Farrington, supra note 208, at 45.
225. Dorothy L. Espelage et al., Teacher and Staff Perceptions of School
Environment as Predictors of Student Aggression, Victimization, and Willingness
to Intervene in Bullying Situations, 29 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 287, 301 (2014).
226. Id.
227. See supra Part I.B.2.
228. Supra Part I.B.
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do so not only because such guidance offers a chance to meaningfully
address bullying, but also because aligning the laws with the role the Court
has envisioned for schools offers a way to address and resolve the First
Amendment problems with the anti-bullying laws. Perhaps most
importantly, better aligning the anti-bullying laws with the Supreme
Court’s view of schools’ role would more adequately serve students. It
would better honor the call of Hailee Lamberth’s final note.
First, legislatures should largely or totally eliminate the use of school
exclusion as a method for intervening to address bullying. Social science
literature has shown the problems associated with school exclusion in the
context of bullying. It simply, with rare possible exceptions, does not
address the problem. From there, legislatures could choose from a variety
of other methods of intervention to address bullying.
As there are multiple effective methods of addressing bullying other
than school exclusion, states need only pick from among them and amend
their laws to include those effective approaches. Although passing
legislation is no simple process, each year for the last several years, at least
one or two states have amended their anti-bullying laws.229 It is certainly
possible, even likely, that states will continue in the coming years to
amend their anti-bullying laws. When states do, they should amend their
anti-bullying laws to include a requirement that schools use methods that
social science has found effective for addressing bullying.
A possible critique to this approach, though, is cost. Implementing PBIS
or another similar school-wide program could be costly, not to mention time
consuming.230 Yet, if schools and states truly want to address bullying, it

229. For example, in 2015, Nevada amended its anti-bullying law, and Montana
passed its first anti-bullying law. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1351-1355 (West 2016).
Cherub, supra note 49. In 2014, Illinois amended its bullying as did Massachusetts. See
John Byrne, Quinn to Sign Anti-Bullying Bill, CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2014, 9:26 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-quinn-to-sign-antibullyingbill-20140626-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y9H7-MAS2]; see also Sebastian Alamo,
Patrick Signs Bullying Bill for LGBTQ Students, DAILY FREE PRESS (Apr. 27, 2014,
9:43 PM), http://dailyfreepress.com/2014/04/27/patrick-signs-bullying-bill-for-lgbtqstudents/ [https://perma.cc/8JST-YA68]. In 2013, Indiana amended its bullying law.
Carmen McCollum, Schools Comply with New Indiana Bullying Law, TIMES
NORTHWESTERN IND. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/schoolscomply-with-new-indiana-bullying-law/article_f5cab9d9-38f2-5f25-b439-5fadad187f
6b.html [https://perma.cc/A5BG-GB5S].
230. This fact has been acknowledged by social science researchers. See
generally Bruce A. Blonigen et al., Application of Economic Analysis to
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makes little sense to do so in an ineffective way. The cost may be
unavoidable, as at least some states have already begun to recognize. In
response to Hailee Lamberth’s suicide, Nevada revised its anti-bullying
statute in the spring of 2015 to make it more effective.231 Among other
things, the newly revised law allocates $16 million to schools to hire social
workers specifically to address bullying.232 With enough political will, the
cost concern can be overcome.
All said, lower-cost, non-school-wide methods have, as noted above,
also been found to work. For example, schools can do much to help combat
bullying simply by increasing supervision in traditionally unsupervised
areas, such as hallways and bathrooms, where students feel least safe and
bullying is most likely to happen.233 Adopting this approach would require
little or no additional cost to schools because schools’ current staff could
be deployed to provide this supervision. Thus, although there are highercost means of addressing bullying, schools can adopt effective antibullying approaches with minimal costs.
C. A First Amendment Deference Argument
Of course, legislatures need not follow any guidance from the
Supreme Court in developing local school policy. If they did, such that
schools’ available responses to bullying better aligned with the work the
Court understands schools to do—at the very least by eliminating school
exclusion as a response to bullying except in rare circumstances—then a
First Amendment argument exists that schools should have more
deference when they act to suppress student-bullying speech. That is, there
is an argument that schools should have the deference to suppress studentbullying speech as a categorical matter, meaning the deference to suppress
any speech that could reasonably be deemed bullying speech. This argument
would involve adding a layer to the analytic framework for determining
schools’ deference to suppress student speech. Instead of the schools’
deference to suppress student speech being dependent on the type of speech
and the schools’ role in relation to it, in the bullying context this argument
calls for a framework in which the means schools use are considered. In
Schoolwide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBS) Programs,
10 J. POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL SUPPORTS 5 (2008); Linda M. Bambara et al.,
Perceived Barriers and Enablers to Implementing Individualized Positive
Behavioral Interventions and Supports in School Settings, 25 J. POSITIVE
BEHAVIORAL SUPPORTS 1 (2012).
231. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1325; Cherub, supra note 49.
232. Id.
233. See Vaillancourt et al., supra note 222, at 50.
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this proposed framework, if the means were aligned with effectuating the
Court’s understanding of schools’ role, then that would justify more
deference for the suppression of student-bullying speech.
The support for that deference argument is three-fold. First, better
aligning the work the schools do in the bullying context to the work the
Court understands schools to do by at least eliminating methods like
school exclusion that do not address bullying would essentially have a
tailoring effect justifying increased deference. The work that the Court
understands schools to do, though usually conceptualized by the Court as
schools’ roles or functions, are also state interests.234 In identifying those
roles to justify giving schools deference to suppress student speech, the
Court is acknowledging the legitimacy of state interests. Better aligning
schools’ responses to bullying to that work, or those interests, then,
justifies increased, categorical First Amendment deference in the bullying
context because it better ensures the work is being done or, put another
way, the state interests are being achieved. Moreover, the Court has
already allowed schools this kind of categorical deference in the case of
lewd and drug-promoting speech.235 Although the Court has not tied that
categorical deference to how well tailored the schools’ means are in
effectuating those roles, in the case of bullying where much is known
about what works, and perhaps more importantly, that the previous
standard methods of school exclusion do not work, it should require better
tailoring to justify the deference.236
Second, increasing school deference based on legislation that better
aligns schools’ anti-bullying efforts with the Court’s conception of schools
would avoid the problems involved in applying the Tinker standard and
thus would save the application of the laws from violating the First
234. Indeed, in Morse, the Court found schools’ role in protecting student drug
abuse justified in part because of the “‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’
interest” in deterring drug use by children. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407
(2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
235. Supra notes 148–56.
236. One could argue that the tension with the anti-bullying laws, the schools’
means for addressing bullying, and the work the Court understands schools to do
only becomes clear after the fact of intervention, which of course would make
narrow tailoring challenging. However, the social science has been so clear on the
fact that school exclusion, the primary mechanism called for in the anti-bullying
laws, does not work and can be counter-productive in the bullying context, that
the tension cannot be said to reveal itself only after the fact of its use. The social
science is clear enough on the problems with school exclusion as a method for
addressing bullying that it is predictable that it will not work to accomplish the
work of the schools as understood by the Supreme Court. Supra notes 196–202.
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Amendment at all, as Saxe suggests can be done despite overbreadth. That
standard is sometimes rather unworkable in the bullying context, but is
nonetheless the standard the lower courts have thus far applied to bullying
cases.237 Giving schools more deference to suppress student-bullying
speech categorically would circumvent these problems because it would
allow schools to suppress any speech that could reasonably be deemed
bullying speech—if anti-bullying laws called for schools to use methods
other than school exclusion to address bullying—irrespective of whether
it could be said to cause the school to anticipate a substantial disruption. It
would allow them to intervene to address the kind of bullying speech
Hailee endured.
Third, affording schools this deference would better protect student
rights. Although it might seem counterintuitive to argue that suppressing
student speech better protects student rights, in this context the argument is
strong. As things currently stand, schools have a significant amount of
deference to suppress student speech regardless of its effect in the bullying
context—sometimes to no end and sometimes to the end of exacerbating the
bullying. Although the approach discussed here would increase schools’
deference, or authority, to suppress student speech, it would only do so if
the anti-bullying laws changed to better align with the work the Court
understands schools to do. Such change would also mean better addressing
the complicated causes and effects of bullying and thereby would better
protect and assist both victims and students who bully. Imagine, then, a law
that called for schools to intervene in bullying and thus suppress bullying
speech by not using school exclusion and instead using PBIS or increased
counseling, which have been used to good effect in the bullying context and
237. Many of these cases involve student-bullying speech that occurs offcampus. Some target other students, and some target teachers or school
administrators. All apply the Tinker standard. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the Tinker standard to determine that a
student’s discipline for an off-campus rap song targeting two coaches in its lyrics
did not violate the First Amendment); see also S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s
Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773–78 (8th Cir. 2012) (vacating a
preliminary injunction lifting suspensions of students for creating website with
blog containing variety of offensive, racist, and sexist comments about school and
classmates); see also Layschock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (using the Tinker standard to conclude a student’s First
Amendment rights had been violated when he was sent to an alternative school
for creating a website parodying a principal); see also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ.
of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the Tinker
standard in the context of a First Amendment challenge by a student who was
disciplined for sending an instant message with a picture of a gun and referencing
a teacher).
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so align with the work the Court understands schools to do, for the bully or
the victim. Those schools would have deference to suppress student speech
that could reasonably be deemed bullying speech by requiring PBIS
interventions or counseling. That deference and the suppression of studentbullying speech would be used to better address bullying and its complicated
effects on the victim and the bully.
One criticism of this argument, though, might be that schools should
not be afforded deference to suppress student-bullying speech given the
increased authority they have under the anti-bullying laws, including to do
things like broadly monitor students’ online and electronic activity.238 This
critique first ignores the fact that schools now have a significant amount
of deference to do just that kind of surveillance to no end or to the end of
exacerbating the bullying problem. Second, in a previous article, the
author called for limits on that authority, and does not abandon those
proposals here.239 Indeed, they work in conjunction with the arguments set
forth here.240 Those limits on school surveillance authority, coupled with
basing any increased deference to suppress student-bullying speech on
laws that better tailor schools’ available responses to the work the Court
understands schools to do, should still protect student rights by ensuring
the deference is only given when the schools’ responses work to
effectively limit bullying and address its complicated effects.
However, an argument exists that increased deference is not needed
because the reasoning of Fraser and Morse applies in the context of
bullying without any attendant means analysis. As the Court gave schools
deference to suppress student drug-promoting speech as a categorical
matter in those cases, then schools should get the same level of deference
with respect to bullying speech. That argument fails to recognize that at
least one lower court has extended the reasoning of Morse to the bullying
context, but then applied the Tinker standard. In Kowalski v. Berkeley
County Schools, the Fourth Circuit considered a student’s First
Amendment claim in the context of cyberbullying.241 The student had been
suspended from school for creating a website that targeted another student
by calling her names.242 Referencing the schools’ protective role identified
in Morse, the court stated that “[j]ust as schools have a responsibility to
provide a safe environment for students free from messages advocating
illegal drug use . . . schools have a duty to protect their students from

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Supra Part I.B.
Suski, supra note 194.
Id.
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.
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harassment and bullying in the school environment.”243 Despite using this
Morse rationale, the court did not conclude that bullying speech could be
categorically suppressed as the Supreme Court concluded with respect to
drug-promoting speech in Morse.244 The Fourth Circuit instead applied the
less deferential Tinker standard, which requires that the school anticipated
that the speech would cause a substantial disruption or be injurious to the
rights of others.245 Thus at least one lower court has not found that bullying
justifies any more deference to suppress student speech beyond that
afforded them in Tinker even when it extended the rationale of Morse to
the bullying context.
Of course an argument could be made that the Fourth Circuit simply
reached the wrong result in Kowalski, and it should have given the school
deference to suppress bullying speech as a categorical matter based on the
reasoning in Morse. Such an argument would allow for the suppression of
student speech and the infringement on important student rights often to
no end. That result is simply untenable for both the bully, whose rights
would be suppressed, and the victim, who would not be protected.
Another possible critique of this argument is that it would require courts
to assess the methodology of schools in order to determine whether they
should get added deference to suppress bullying speech. The Court has
repeatedly stated that lower courts should not inquire into the daily workings
of schools.246 That critique, though, misunderstands the nature of the
argument. The argument does not call for an inquiry into the precise nature
of any particular method of addressing bullying or an assessment of how
well schools are implementing the means called for by the legislatures.247
Instead, it simply argues that if legislatures call for or require schools to take
some meaningful steps, which precludes, largely or totally, school
exclusion, to align with the Court’s understanding of schools’ role and
address bullying in ways that do not cause more bullying, then the courts
should give them deference to suppress all speech that can reasonably be
construed as bullying speech. No examination of the school’s day-to-day

243. Id. at 572.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 572–73.
246. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969);
see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 507).
247. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (rejecting the use
of Lochner principles and stating the Court does not “sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions”).
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work or methodology other than whether the legislature has called for such
steps need occur.
A related criticism to this argument is that it leaves the determination of
constitutional deference up to social science. However, this ignores the
distinction between the means framework for analysis, which calls for an
assessment of the means by which schools address bullying and would give
deference if they at least use methods other than those that clearly do not
work, and the substance of the actual methods themselves. The deference
would not depend on the use of any particular method. The deference would
depend on the use of some methods that do something to address bullying
and thereby align with the Court’s conception of schools. That can rarely,
if ever, include school exclusion. Even though the alignment may not be a
perfect alignment, it will at least not be the near-total misalignment that is
school exclusion in relation to the bullying problem.248
Finally, one could criticize this argument by suggesting that better
aligning the work the anti-bullying laws call for schools to do with the
work the Court understands schools to do, would too tightly constrain the
schools. It would too greatly limit their ability to exclude students from
school. However, at least one state and some school districts are so
limiting school exclusion by suspension and expulsion on their own.
Illinois has recently passed a law that makes school exclusion the
disciplinary option of last resort.249 Similarly, the Miami Dade County
Schools and the Seattle School Board have also moved to limit
suspensions and expulsions.250 That states and school districts are limiting
248. This sort of analysis would be akin to the analysis called for in
determining whether schools violate Title IX or other anti-harassment laws by
allowing student-on-student violence. In those cases, schools are not required to
intervene to address harassment in any particular way. They just must intervene
in ways that are clearly not unreasonable. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v.
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999).
249. Evie Blad, New Illinois Law to Prompt Changes in Discipline Policies,
EDUC. WK. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/09/09/newillinois-law-to-prompt-changes-in.html [https://perma.cc/8QG4-E47N]. California
has also passed legislation to limit suspensions and expulsions for students in
kindergarten, first, second, and third grades. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016)
(amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)).
250. Paige Cornwell, Seattle School Board Halts Suspensions for Elementary
Students, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/education/seattle-school-board-halts-suspensions-for-elementary-students/?u
tm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=article_left [https://per
ma.cc/6FKF-LWKR]; Blad, supra note 249; John O’Connor, Miami-Dade Schools
Eliminating Out-of-School Suspensions, NPR (July 29, 2015, 3:37 PM), https://state
impact.npr.org/florida/2015/07/29/miami-dade-schools-eliminating-out-of-school-
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school exclusion more generally suggests that the constraints on school
exclusion in the bullying context would not too greatly constrain schools’
ability to respond to bullying, particularly if the anti-bullying laws
provided schools with guidance on alternative responses to bullying that
better align with the work the Court understands schools to do, which in
turn better address bullying.
D. Student Implications
Perhaps the most compelling reason for considering whether the antibullying laws should better align with the Court’s conceptions of schools’
roles is that doing so would make schools better equipped to protect
victims of bullying. It bears repeating that bullying is an enormous and
consequential problem. When Nevada revised its bullying law in the
spring of 2015, reports stated that there were over 4,000 incidences of
bullying the previous year alone in Nevada schools.251 Those bullying
events occurred even though Nevada had an anti-bullying law in place.252
The anti-bullying laws, well-meaning though they may be, seek to address
the problem with traditional punitive methods that simply do not work
except in rare circumstances.253 To truly address the problem, the laws
have to do more than rely on traditionally punitive methods of addressing
bullying with their focus on school exclusion. The laws must embrace the
role of schools as the Supreme Court has conceived it. To do that, the antibullying laws and schools should adopt methods of addressing bullying
that prevent the bullying from happening, whether by increasing
supervision or providing counseling to the bully to address the problems
that lead to the bullying behavior.254 They should also more effectively
address the effects of bullying. Again, following Nevada’s lead could go
a long way toward achieving this end. By doing so, they would be teaching
students to participate in school and therefore eventually in the democracy.
They would also be teaching students the value of tolerance and behavioral
norms. They would also be protecting actual or potential bullying victims.
By putting more social workers in schools devoted to addressing bullying,
schools provide students with skilled professionals who can help them
with the depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and the other effects of
bullying for both the bully and the victim. These kinds of approaches
suspensions/ [https://perma.cc/VVP2-B3ZZ].
251. Cherub, supra note 49.
252. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.123 (West 2016).
253. Vaillancourt et al., supra note 222, at 50.
254. Note that while interventions like counseling occur after-the-fact, they
also can prevent reoccurrence. Supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text.
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would not only better align the schools’ efforts with the Supreme Court
jurisprudence, they would also help students and prevent bullying and
better address its complicated effects when it does happen.255
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence and a deconstruction of its deference rationales in the student
speech context to evaluate the limited, punitive approach the anti-bullying
laws have schools take to address bullying. Its focus is on the Court’s student
speech cases because so much of bullying is speech. The Court’s student
speech cases reveal that the Court has a particular understanding of the roles
of schools as they relate to certain categories of speech and that relationship
justifies the degree of deference they receive to suppress student speech.
Analyzing the anti-bullying laws in light of the First Amendment reveals
both that the anti-bullying laws raise First Amendment concerns and also
are problematic in their focus on discipline and school exclusion. However,
First Amendment jurisprudence also offers a way forward. If anti-bullying
laws called for schools to better align with the work the Court understands
schools do by, at the very least, largely eliminating the use of school
exclusion as a means to respond to bullying, then there is an argument that
schools should receive more deference to suppress student-bullying speech.
Perhaps most importantly, better responding to bullying by not using school
exclusion and thus having more deference to so respond would better protect
students, like Hailee Lamberth, who are looking to schools to help address
the problem of bullying.
Of course not all bullying is speech, and to the extent schools have to
address physical or other forms of bullying that do not constitute speech,
the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is, in a sense, of no moment.
But if states and schools take heed of the Court’s understanding of schools’
role in its student speech cases and better align their anti-bullying efforts
255. In a previous article, the author examined the authority given schools in
a subset of the bullying laws, cyberbullying laws, and argued, among other things,
for students to have more rights under them. Suski, supra note 194, at 116–18.
Specifically, the author called for amendments to the laws to include a cause of
action for students so that when schools exceed their surveillance authority under
the laws and cause harm, they have recourse. Id. The author does not abandon
those arguments or related arguments here. Instead, the author adds to those
arguments about how the bullying laws can be made to better align with the
Supreme Court’s view of schools’ work, which would have the benefit of making
the laws more effective at addressing and preventing bullying and potentially
obviating the need for schools to use their surveillance authority in the first place.

754

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

with that role and jettison the use of school exclusion in the bullying
context, the impact can be broader. It can have the effect of not just better
preventing and addressing bullying when it takes the form of speech, but
it can better address all bullying.

